The Carrier vs The Submarine

On 23 February 1928 HMAS Albatross was launched, her name now perpetuated in that of RANAS Nowra, NSW. The ship had a standard displacement of 4800 tons, reached 22. 5 knots (41. 7 km/hr) on 12,000 hp from her Parsons steam turbines, and for most of her active life carried six Supermarine Seagull Ill amphibians. The RAAF provided the aircraft, pilots and maintenance men, but the RAN provided the observers and telegraphists and had operational control of the aircraft. In 1938 the Albatross was traded in as part-exchange on a new cruiser bought from the UK, her aerial reconnaissance role being transferred to Seagull V amphibians operated (one per ship) from each of the RAN’s five cruisers.

The RAN served throughout World War II without aircraft carriers, although Australian ships frequently operated in conjunction with Royal Navy or United States Navy carriers. In the early postwar years the RAN obtained its first carriers of (relatively) modern design: HMAS Vengeance, Sydney (which served with distinction in the Korean War), and Melbourne, the sole surviving member of the trio.

Pondering the Imponderables

In considering whether Melbourne should be replaced by another carrier, or whether the time has come for the RAN to make the submarine its new capital ship, it is necessary to begin with some framework for discussion. What sort of world will the new vessel (ship or boat) be called upon to operate in? What kind of enemies may threaten Australia’s mainland and offshore territories and interests? What defence scenarios can realistically be envisaged? What are the criteria on which the crucial choice between carrier and submarine should rationally be made?

For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union appears likely to continue to represent the principal threat to world peace, although some of Russia’s client states, China, and several of the more volatile non-aligned nations of the Third World may provide a far higher probability of small-scale conflicts. Many nations of the Free World will continue to base their defence on the assumption that they can only remain free and independent by accepting a significant degree of dependence on American defence support, although the variability of US presidential policy on assisting other countries may have already eroded the confidence that is placed in America as an ally. The fact that America cannot be relied upon in every eventuality undoubtedly plays a large part in the continuing vast expenditure by Britain and France on independent nuclear deterrents. Nonetheless, neither country shows any sign of adopting a totally independent defence policy: being friends with America is still the only game in town.

We also know that (according to official US estimates) Soviet capability in nuclear war terms (“discretionary force potential”) will peak around 1985, but that by the end of this decade, the steady growth in American spending will have put the US back on top. It is widely assumed that the Soviets’ current ageing leaders will shortly be replaced by a younger (and possibly more adventurous) generation. The average age of Politburo members is over 70, and Brezhnev himself is 75. New leaders, probably only children at the time of the “Great Patriotic War” may be more tempted to take risks during the period when the nuclear balance clearly favours the Soviet Union. This means not only an increased possibility of a major war in Europe, but also an increased Soviet confidence in undertaking peripheral adventures such as the invasion of Afghanistan. The 1980s will thus be a dangerous decade on a global scale.

Further exacerbating the situation, the traditional sources of oil supplies are expected to run dry early next century (the actual date depending on many imponderables, such as the growth of demand in the Third World), but the Soviet Union’s self-sufficiency in oil will be ended long before this, possibly during the 1980s. If the Russians feel insecure in having to rely on oilfields outside their control, they may be inclined to seize a substantial part of the oil-producing area in Southwest Asia (e. g. Iran and some of the Gulf states) in what for them would be a relatively easy military operation.

With 12,000 km separating the US from the Persian Gulf (22,000 km by sea around the Cape), yet less than 3000 km between the Gulf and Moscow, there exists a serious logistics asymmetry in favour of the Russians, although their combined military and civil air transport fleet has less than half the payload capacity of the American one. In this context, it is worth noting that the Russians have under development a new transport aircraft in the same class as the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, which (if deployed in large numbers) could make the short-term logistics problem even more difficult for the Americans in responding to emergencies in areas close to the Soviet Union, i.e. Europe and all parts of Asia.

The American ability to respond to the Soviet threat in the crucial oil-producing area of Southwest Asia is thus quite clearly limited, notwithstanding the development of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), the availability of bases in friendly states (e. g. Israel, Egypt, Oman, Somalia, Kenya), and the prepositioning of supplies on ships in the Indian Ocean and at the Diego Garcia base.

Part of the American game plan is therefore to use the threat of retaliation in some other part of the world: the Soviet occupation of Iran might be countered by an American invasion of Cuba, for example. To quote General David Jones, USAF (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), “In the event of a conflict, our strategy should be to apply our strengths against their weaknesses, not just necessarily at the point of attack (which may be the enemy’s strength), but across a wide range of painful vulnerabilities. ” It follows that, although Southwest Asia may be one of the most likely areas of conflict throughout the next two decades, military action may be undertaken by the United States against Soviet interests and Soviet client states anywhere in the world.

In discussing the likelihood of a Soviet move toward the Persian Gulf, a further important factor is that Southwest Asia forms a natural bridge to the African countries that produce minerals crucial to the continued operation of manufacturing industries, especially in the West. Countries such as Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, South Africa, Zaire and Zimbabwe together produce a long list of essential materials, including chromium, cobalt, diamonds, manganese and platinum. Evidence of Soviet interest in the region (and that nation’s potential for interfering with trade routes in the Indian Ocean) is provided by the growing string of bases on the East African seaboard to which the Soviet Navy now has routine access, ranging from Ethiopia, Aden and Socotra in the north, down to Maputo (formerly Lourenco Marques) in the south.

From an Australian viewpoint, it is also noteworthy that the Soviets have access to port facilities in the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean and at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. There have been reports of Soviet Air Force Tu-26 Backfire bombers using ex-USAF airfields in Vietnam. Whether or not these reports are true, this possibility has to be taken into account in long-term planning, due to the very strong links between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. According to the Pentagon’s “Soviet Military Power” booklet, the Backfire has a radius of approximately 4500 km (evidently an average of CIA and DIA estimates), which could take in both Darwin and Learmonth. It follows that the time-honoured question about what on earth the RAAF’s tactical fighters are supposed to be providing air defence against has (at last) a sensible answer and the decision to move one F-18 Hornet squadron to Darwin looks all the more rational.

V/STOL Proliferation

The comparative proximity of Soviet basing facilities is clearly a factor that affects RAN planning. Another is the likely proliferation of ships equipped with V/STOL aircraft. The Soviet Navy’s Pacific Fleet already has the Minsk with its Yak-36 V/STOL fighters, and the Kiev class is expected to be augmented by the end of this decade by a 50,000-ton carrier operating around 60 conventional fighters, probably developments of the variable-sweep MiG-23.

On the American side, Marine Corps units with the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific and with the detachments in the Indian Ocean will be operating the AV-BB by the latter half of the 1980s, and a developed version of this aircraft with radar and an uprated engine (AV-8B Plus, the kind of aircraft the RAN would doubtless like to have) may well be operational with the US Navy by the end of the decade.

The Indian Navy will certainly be flying the Magic-armed Sea Harrier from Vikrant within a few years, and the ship will probably be retrofitted with a ski jump to improve the aircraft’s take-off weight at high temperatures. Japan was finally awakened to the vulnerability of her trade routes by the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq and has now taken the first protective step, making the MSDF responsible for the protection of shipping out to 1000 nm {1850 km). In safeguarding Pacific trade routes, VISTOL aircraft have a natural advantage for Japan, in that they can be flown from WW 2 airstrips on the chains of islands that extend to the south, and from her larger destroyers (both the AV-8C and the AV-8B have improved VTO performance by virtue of lift-improvement devices under the fuselage), pending the development of dedicated carriers in the 1990s. According to the Japan Defense Agency, there is nothing in the constitution to stop that country from building aircraft carriers of 30,000 tons or more. In addition to taking a greater share in the defence of her own region, Japan has also been under pressure from America to participate in a cooperative security arrangement to safeguard the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, on the basis that Japan (like Western Europe) is far more dependent on this source of supply than is America. Within the period here under discussion, Japan may well be pressed further to take part in such a force, and by the end of the century, we could see MSDF carriers patrolling the Indian Ocean.

It is well known that the Chinese People’s Republic is seriously interested in acquiring V/STOL aircraft and that procurement and licence-manufacture of the British Aerospace Harrier is currently delayed by the same budgetary problems that afflict many Western nations. What is less widely known is that the intention was to operate these Harriers not only within the Air Force element of the PLA but also as part of Naval Aviation. This dual-service approach is perhaps more natural for the Chinese than for most potential V/STOL aircraft operators, since Naval Aviation of the PLA (being primarily a coastal defence force) is administered as part of the Air Force, although it comes under the operational control of the Navy. Nonetheless, the intention of Naval Aviation was (and presumably still is) to operate the Shenyang-built Harriers from ships.

Within ten years, five or six foreign services may thus be operating V/STOL aircraft in the sea areas of direct concern to Australia. On a similar timescale (again quoting from official American documents), it is possible that a dozen or more nations could have some military nuclear capability. It might also be presumed that a handful of first-generation nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) of the hunter-killer type may be passed on by the Soviets to the more trusted of their satellites.

As a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia cannot match any movement toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the regions of primary· concern (should such movement occur), and the RAN is not in a position to operate SSNs, having no in-country nuclear power plants to provide the necessary fuel.

However, nuclear proliferation is a factor to be taken into account, as are Soviet developments in chemical and bacteriological warfare. Chemical weapons are reported to have been supplied by the Russians to various Arab countries and to have been used operationally by the Russians and their allies both in Afghanistan and in Southeast Asia. The 1979 Sverdlovsk incident in which a number of Russians were reported to have died is taken in the West to be evidence of Soviet activity in the field of bacteriological warfare. From an Australian viewpoint, the important point is arguable that the country may already be vulnerable, not only to interdiction of her sea lines of communication (SLOG), but also to attack by the Soviet Union or a client state using chemical or bacteriological weapons against her population centres or primary industry.

In addition to these new factors in defence planning, there remain the fundamental considerations that have been present for decades. For example, the fact that no nation can invade Australia on a significant scale unless from island bases immediately to the north. The sustained growth of the Soviet Navy. The problem of protecting on a relatively small budget a series of city “outposts” that are strung out along a 20,000 km coastline, against a threat that could take several forms and which might develop more quickly than appropriate defences could be provided.

In any discussion of scenarios, since Australian strategic assessments see no threat of nuclear attack short of the ultimate catastrophe of global war, the worst case remains the invasion bf the Darwin area or the north-west. This case may not determine the selection of new equipment, but it is inconceivable that any major defence programme would be undertaken in Australia that did not contribute significantly to the nation’s ability to “attrit” an invasion force. In spite of this, there are several defence situations that can be conceived, that would have more serious and immediate consequences for the average Australian than the loss of land and resources in the north-west.

The use of chemical and bacteriological weapons against the primary industry is a possible threat to which Australia is especially vulnerable, in view of the part played by this industry in the national economy, the immense coastline, and the country’s small population. Likewise, the vast stretches of ocean that have insulated the continent from attack also make Australia highly vulnerable to the interdiction of seaborne trade, without which life in Australia could not continue in its present form. Successive defence reports have progressively reduced Australian claims in the field of SLOG defence capability, with corresponding increases in the share of the task allocated to the US Navy, although the Americans have made it abundantly clear that it is unfair to be stuck with the complete task in a remote area such as the Arabian Sea.

Not that the potential threat to SLOCs is necessarily a distant one. Something in the region of half of Australia’s external trade passes through four straits in the Indonesian archipelago: the Russians would not need a dozen Kirov-class cruisers in the Indian Ocean to interdict Australian SLOCs, they could do it with a handful of FPBs and time-expired submarines. Alternatively, the same results could be accomplished by their SSNs mining the sea approaches to Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth. In this context, it is noteworthy that the recent grounding of the Soviet Whisky-class submarine in close proximity to a Swedish naval base was said by some naval experts to be associated with the laying of nuclear nines that in wartime could be detonated by remote command. Whether or not this is true, there is little to prevent SSNs from Vladivostok carrying out routine training missions in Australian coastal waters, and it is important that all foreign submarines close to the nation’s major ports should be detected and identified, in peacetime as in war.

In addition to countering direct threats to Australian territory, resources and interests, the defence forces should also be capable of assisting the country’s allies and friends. The ANZUS Treaty commits Australia to go to the aid of the US or New Zealand if either suffers an armed attack in the Pacific area, and there is also a less formal obligation to assist (or at least to consult with) Malaysia and Singapore in the event of an externally organised or supported armed attack. The same would almost certainly apply in the case of an external threat to Indonesia or PNG, both of which are of crucial importance to Australia’s security, yet neither of which has a defence treaty with Australia. Quite serious commitments might develop in this context without America becoming involved, either because of other problem areas, the Vietnam analogy, or the fear of being accused of colonialism.

All of the above scenarios are of concern to the defence planners in Canberra. Australia needs defence equipment that is highly credible as a deterrent, effective across a broad range of scenarios, moderate in cost, and can be supported locally in terms of overhauls and high-utilisation spares. Since any new equipment will generate a peak in defence effectiveness, this should correspond as closely as possible to in the severity of the perceived threat. Ideally, the peak in cash flow should also be matched to that in funding availability, and the peak in AIP workload should be matched to a dip in existing workload for the manufacturing industry.

The Carrier

The case for the small, modern aircraft carrier is that it provides unrivalled flexibility, with its mixed load of helicopters and fixed-wing V/STOL aircraft, and its command and control facilities.

As a deterrent to a small nation looking for trouble, the carrier is a highly visible, long-range equivalent of the old gunboat concept, its missile-armed aircraft giving a strike radius in excess of 500 nm (925 km). In ocean surveillance it can cover a large area, operating beyond the range of land-based aircraft. In convoy escort it can provide protection against short-range submarine attack and against shadowing aircraft. In amphibious landings it can transport large numbers of troops and large quantities of supplies, and carry out close air support missions, its V/STOL aircraft moving ashore to short airstrips if desired. In addition, the carrier can perform a useful function in peacetime, aside from that of deterrence, in disaster relief operations and in flag-waving exercises. What the carrier cannot do is to operate without support from other ships, or close to enemy bases, i. e. in the MiG-rich, FPS-rich environment.

Accepting these limitations, an aircraft carrier can undoubtedly perform a useful function in the vast majority of defence scenarios of interest to Australia, including an invasion in the Darwin area, safeguarding trade routes across the Indian Ocean, taking aircraft to the assistance of Malaysia, and participating in the defence of the vital islands to the north.

The arguments against the carrier are that it is an expensive system in terms of its demands on escort ships, that it amounts to putting all your eggs in one vulnerable basket (or two), and that some of its roles can be performed equally well by other means, e. g. submarines, Harpoon-armed P-3Cs, and landbased fighters.

The British went through a similar debate in the mid-1960s when the Royal Navy was planning the 54,000-ton CVA-01 to operate conventional Mach 2 fighters. The anti-carrier lobby won the day on the basis that fighter cover could be provided more cost-effectively from shore bases, and that ASW helicopters could be operated from frigates and destroyers. The CVA-01 was cancelled in 1966.

However, it was soon found that RAF claims regarding the capabilities of flight-refuelled, land-based Phantoms in providing air cover for naval operations were not borne out in exercises. Experience also proved that effective ASW operations using large helicopters required a larger ship, which could carry far more helicopters with full support facilities, and could also accept command facilities to control a large, distributed ASW force of ships, aircraft and submarines. The result was the Command Cruiser or CCH. Design studies then proved that for comparatively little penalty a number of Harrier V/STOL fighters could be added, giving an air defence, strike, and reconnaissance capability. The result was the Invincible.

In a major war, the Invincible-class carriers of the RN would be operated as part of a NATO carrier battle group, with the US Navy providing most of the cruiser and destroyer escorts, plus the F-14 Tomcats and (above all) the E-2Cs for airborne early warning. In a small war, the RN could operate alone, on the basis that the enemy’s offensive capability would be significantly less than that of the Soviet Navy. On the other hand, it can be argued that this black-or-white situation is an oversimplification and that the RN might find itself up against Soviet forces (or a Soviet client state with fairly advanced Russian equipment) without the US Navy in attendance. In such circumstances, which the RN would clearly try to avoid, the British view is that it is absolutely vital to destroy shadowing aircraft, and hence minimise knowledge of the ship’s location. In this role, there is no substitute for a fixed-wing aircraft: ship-launched missiles simply cannot do the job.

In considering alternative ways to perform the other roles of the V/STOL aircraft, some experts have argued that the strike mission can be done by Harpoon-armed ships, P-36 aircraft, or submarines. The vulnerability of any large propeller-driven aircraft in the face of Soviet Navy SAMs or V/STOL fighters hardly bears thinking about, but surface vessels and submarines can do the strike job if they are in the right place at the right time.

Land-based aircraft can substitute for sea-based air power at a radius that varies with the mission: air defence and strike at short radius, ocean surveillance and ASW at a much longer radius. However, if it is accepted that a threat to SLOCs might arise in a form that must be countered by Australia alone, or that the US Navy may be so stretched that it needs help at long range, then there is no substitute for the carrier.

The Submarine

The argument for the submarine is that it can be used to interdict enemy SLOCs at long range, completely without support. It requires no escort vessels, no replenishment ships, and no air cover. All the money goes directly into the submarine and its homing torpedoes and guided weapons. It is also a very effective way to track down and destroy other submarines in areas where they may be expected to operate, i. e. the choke points, since it can get below the thermoclines that reflect transmissions from surface sonars.

The submarine thus has a considerable deterrent value at a professional level, although it is less impressive to politicians and the general public. It could certainly perform well in the invasion scenario mentioned earlier, and in countering enemy submarine activities in the neighbourhood of ports and straits. However, it is largely irrelevant to most other scenarios, including convoy protection and operations to assist Australia’s friends and allies.

There is thus a case to be made for both the carrier and the submarine. The carrier epitomises the versatility that successive Australian defence ministers have advocated, and it provides capabilities for which there is no substitute. On the other hand, in certain circumstances, it can be very vulnerable, and its special capabilities might be regarded as duplicating services that would probably be provided free of charge by the US Navy. The submarine has very low vulnerability and is highly cost-effective in anti-shipping strikes and in some aspects of ASW. However, in many important scenarios, it would be useless to Australia.

In this writer’s view, for the RAN to abandon the carrier would be to place an unfair load on the US Navy. It would be seen as a refusal to accept any responsibility whatever for the protection of most of the trade routes on which Australia depends. It can also be argued that the RAN should be aiming to increase its contribution to defence in this decade of heightened risk. The. Carrier affords an opportunity for an early improvement in capability, whereas submarines suitable for augmenting and later replacing the Oberon class will not be available until the late 1980s. The Type 2400, for example, will not be delivered to the first customer until 1987, and could not be operational with the RAN much before 1990.