Australian Meteors In Korea

F/Lt. Max Scannell, a New Zealander serving in the Royal Air Force, watched them. He had come to Korea with the Meteors and had helped to train the Australian pilots in their conversion from the F-51 Mustang. He was the leader of “Baker” Flight.

“Baker Two” was Sgt. Bruce Thomson, one of the new pilots.

F/Lt. “Scotty” Caden led “Charlie” Flight. He was, another experienced pilot who had flown Mustangs in the pre-Meteor days. On April 6, 1951, on the last day of Mustang operations, he had been one of a four-plane flight that had caught a convoy of Chinese trucks in the open and completely destroyed it. He and his companions had been interviewed by U. S. Television newsmen after they landed. That seemed a long time ago – now he waited.

Sgt. Vance Drummond, another New Zealander and another of the new pilots as well, also watched and waited. He had joined the R. A. A. F. in 1949 and not long after graduating as a pilot, he had been sent to Korea. That was just over three months ago.

Sgt. Ernest Armit, who had flown on the very first Meteor mission in April 1951, watched and waited. Armit’s experience on Meteors had been eventful to say the least. On September 10 he’d had a nasty experience with one of the Meteor 7 trainers. One of the squadron’s N. C. O.s, who was due to return to Australia, had asked to have a trip in a jet. It was arranged that Armit would give him a flight. They had been airborne for about 30 minutes when, with a nasty crack, while executing a turn, the cockpit canopy suddenly flew off. Fortunately, they landed without further mishap and the N. C. O. said that he may have accidentally grabbed the hood opening handle during the turn. An inspection of the plane suggested that the release handle had not been operated. Armit had been on the receiving end of a MiG’s cannons on at least two occasions. In September his plane had taken hits but the damage had been slight and he’d managed to stay in formation during the flight. On November 3, a 37 mm shell had passed right through his port engine causing the Rolls Royce Derwent to flame out. Through skill and good fortune, he was able to return to Kimpo on one engine. What would be the result of this encounter? He watched and waited tensely.

And so did the rest of them. They all watched and waited – it was all they could do. It was obvious that the MiGs were going to attack and all they could do was wait.

The MiGs were always above and they always made sure they had an advantage in numbers. There was little that any of the United Nations pilots could do about that because they had all been prevented by U. N. regulations from flying across the Yalu River into Chinese airspace. The enemy could track their opponents on radar, take off safely from their bases without any fear of attack and climb until they were well above the Allied formations before crossing into Korea.

From the point of view of the Australian pilots, there was little to be achieved in trying to gain height anyway. Experience had shown that the MiG-15’s performance was superior to that of the Meteor B’s at high altitudes. It was better to wait lower down where there was a better chance.

Although always outnumbered and always at a height disadvantage, the Meteors had not really done so badly. While it was true that there were no certain kills up to December 1, hits had been scored and damage recorded on a number of occasions. Furthermore, the British jet had demonstrated that it could absorb a tremendous amount of damage and still manage to bring its pilot home safely. Only one plane had been lost in air to-air combat and the pilot, Warrant Officer R. D. Guthrie, had bailed out safely and was now a P. O. W. (refer to June 1981, issue). However, a number of the Meteors had been damaged, some of them badly. One, from the clash on November 3, was completely beyond repair and had to be broken up into parts. This was in addition to Armit’s plane which had lost an engine in the same battle.

Meteor losses were being watched carefully by the Australian Government in Canberra. Initially, 36 Meteor 8s and 2 Meteor 7s had been bought from the British Government. On r August 20, 1951, the Australian Cabinet had approved the purchase of 22 more to meet an annual anticipated loss rate of 28 aircraft. This meant that they were allowing for the loss of between two and three planes per month. Unfortunately, air-to air combat was not the only factor involved. For example, on November 11, while returning from a successful sweep over Sinangu, two Meteors collided in mid-air resulting in the loss of one pilot and both planes. The Australian Government was also becoming conscious of the performance deficiencies of the Meteor 8 when it was up against the MiG-15.

And today the MiGs meant business. They were in pairs and they were coming down!

They came power diving down and endeavoured to swing onto the tails of Max Scannell’s “Baker” Flight and “Scotty” Caden’s “Charlie” Flight. The Meteors broke, Geoff Thornton’s “Able” Flight swinging swiftly around. Everything began happening at once.

“Charlie” Flight broke late and two Meteors took hits. Ernest Armit and Vance Drummond were under attack. Drummond’s voice crackled over the radio. His fuel tanks had been hit and his electrical gear had been damaged – it was not functioning.

Bruce Gogerly of “Able” Flight could see Drummond’s Meteor in a hard right-hand turn. It was streaming fuel. The two MiGs which were attacking it flashed by Gogerly’s nose. With John Myers guarding his tail, Gogerly cut inside them, selected one and fired off a five-second burst from his four 20 mm cannon. The shells exploded on the fuselage and starboard1 wing root of his target. The second MiG made off. Myers saw’ the strikes along the fuselage of Gogerly’s MiG and fired a burst as well. It was not really needed. The MiG turned to the left and went down streaming fuel. They did not see what happened to it then because of the battle but several others saw it explode in mid-air and fall in flames.

Gogerly was suddenly attacked by two more MiGs as they made a head-on firing pass. He met them with his own guns as they hurtled on and flashed by. The battle was erupting into confusion and there seemed to be too many swept wings and red noses for the Australians to handle.

Max Scannell, the New Zealander, had followed Gogerly and Myers around but before he could attack the other MiG he saw two others coming down onto his tail. He pushed his Meteor into a climbing turn into the sun to shake them off. At 27 000 feet (8230 m) he levelled and found that he had lost them. At the same time, he saw an aircraft go down in flames at about 24 000 feet (7315 m). But there was no time to enjoy the sights. Below were two Meteors being chased by two MiGs. The MiGs were only a few hundred yards behind the Australians. The New Zealanders began to position themselves to drive them off. Before opening fire, he checked his tail. The blind spot dead astern did not help. He spotted them in a heart-stopping instant. There were two more MiGs coming in and he had to break away violently. This time, by the time he had shaken them off, he had lost considerable height. As he looked around to get his bearings, he noticed two aircraft burning on the ground.

“Scotty” Caden had also seen the two Meteors under attack that Max Scannell had attempted to help. He went after them but also attracted the unwanted attention of two more MiGs. There was no choice – he had to escape. After a series of violent manoeuvres and dives he emerged five miles (8 km) to the north of the fight. But he was not alone. No less than seven MiGs were around and ready to pounce on him. His only chance was to dive away again before they could close in.

After he had shaken them off he heard Geoff Thornton’s voice coming over the radio. He was calling for a squadron check. One by one the voices called in and Thornton was I was satisfied that everyone had answered. Apparently “Baker /Two”, Bruce Thomson, had lost contact during a break and he was returning home.

The battle was over. It had lasted about ten minutes.

In ones and twos, the Australians landed back at Kimpo. Their faces showed the strain of combat but they were happy. It had been a desperate encounter against overwhelming odds but after the MiGs had lost their initial height advantage they did not take long to turn their noses towards the Manchurian border and sanctuary. Two of them did not make it. Bruce Gogerly had scored the squadron’s first confirmed kill. Film from his camera gun showed the MiG taking heavy punishment and it was seen by others going down in flames. Two planes had crashed and had been seen burning on the ground. Since all of the Australians had been accounted for immediately after the battle through the squadron check, they could only have been downed MiGs. A number of pilots had claimed hits but results had not been observed because of the furious nature of the engagement. Since no one could be certain who had shot down the second MiG, it was credited as a squadron kill and shared between them all.

But, as time passed, their elation over their successes began to wane. Something was wrong. Three Meteors were not yet back.

News came that “Baker Two”, Bruce Thomson, had been tracked to within 80 miles (128 km) of Kimpo by the Controller.

Thomson had then asked for directions. The Controller had given him a steer but “Baker Two” did not acknowledge the message. He had gone off the air.

Time passed . . . tension grew. . . no more news. Time passed. . . until . . . for Thomson and the others it ran out. The fuel deadline came and went. Now the Australians realized that the others would not be coming home. The missing pilots were Bruce Thomson, Ernest Armit and the New Zealander, Vance Drummond.

An F-80 Shooting Star, low on fuel, landed at Kimpo. It had been in a fight. Its pilot was from the U. S. 49th Group. He and his wingman had been flying in the same general area in which Thomson had last been located and they had been jumped by MiGs. The other F-80 had been shot down. 77 Squadron’s Intelligence Officer, F/Lt. Ralph Davidson, assisted in the debriefing. He asked the American if he had seen any Meteors in the vicinity. The reply was negative but it now seemed obvious that Thomson, and probably the others as well, had fallen victim to patrolling MiGs.

In spite of their first victories over the Russian-built jet, the overwhelming mood of the Australian pilots that night was one of gloom.

An important decision had to be made and made quickly.

The battle on December 1 had made it blatantly clear once and for all, if it had not been so before, that the Meteor 8 was outclassed by the MiG-15. The MiG was faster, climbed better and was more manoeuvrable at high altitude. The fact that some had been brought down could only be attributed to the skill of the Australian pilots. It was obvious that the Communists would not change their, winning tactics. They would always come over with a height advantage; they would always come over with greater numbers. Without a plane to match the MiG’s performance, the Australians could only look forward to more losses.

There was really no choice in the matter. The anticipated loss rate of between two and three planes per month had been reached on the very first day of the month! Furthermore, between November 3 and December 1, a period of four weeks, 5 Meteors had been lost and one had needed to be broken up for parts. This figure was twice the allowable loss rate and did not take into consideration the other aircraft which had suffered damage.

Nor was it a strategic necessity now for the Australians to suffer more losses. The F-86A Sabre had proved highly successful in its encounters with the MiG-15 but up until December there had not been enough of them. After suffering crippling B-29 losses in October, the U. S. A. F. had decided to re-equip its 51st Wing with the new F-86E Sabre. Under the command of the World War Two P-47 ace, Col. Francis S. Gabreski, the 51st began operations on December 1, the same day as the Meteor/MiG clash over Sunchon. The U. S. A. F. now had two wings of Sabres in action.

No one was really very surprised when, from December 2, 77 Squadron was taken off fighter sweep duties.

Another decision was now necessary. How should the Meteors be used? The Australian pilots were not happy with the situation. They feared that there was a real possibility that they would be withdrawn from the war altogether. This did not suit them.

One aspect of the Meteor’s performance was of obvious use. It was the fastest-climbing Allied fighter in Korea at the time. In fact, it could gain altitude quicker than the Sabre. Fifth Air Force Operations placed 77 Squadron on “strip alert” duties. The Meteors had to be ready, at a moment’s notice, to scramble and intercept enemy aircraft that might be coming over on a raid. The squadron was on constant readiness. It was a sentence to both tension and boredom because, except for a few sporadic light aircraft night raids, the enemy never came. December and winter wore on.

At the Communist prisoner-of-war camp at Pinchon-Nee, W. O. Ron Guthrie (who was promoted to Flying Officer whilst a P. O. W. ), the Meteor pilot who had been shot down on August 29, met two new arrivals. They were R. A. A. F. pilots, two of the three who had been shot down on December 1. They were Vance Drummond and Bruce Thomson. Ernest Armit’s final encounter with the MiG-15s had proved fatal.

Late in December, the 77 Squadron received a new commanding officer, Wing Commander Ronald Susans was a World War Two ace and had served in North Africa, Malta, Sicily and Italy and later in New Guinea and Borneo. He had been awarded the D. F. C. and had also been Mentioned in Dispatches. A big man, he found it rather cramped in the cockpit of a Meteor particularly during the winter months while wearing all the necessary warm clothing under his flying suit.

It was not in Susan’s nature to sit still and let the enemy come to him. He approached the commanding general of the Fifth Air Force, General Everest. He pointed out that, although the Meteor was outclassed as a high-altitude interceptor, it was a rugged aircraft that could absorb a tremendous amount of damage. It was also a steady gun platform and should be an excellent rocket-firing aircraft. As well, it had the added advantage of two engines. If one was put out of action it could still fly using the other. He wanted to try the Meteor out in the ground attack role.

With enthusiasm reflected from Susans, General Everest agreed provided that “strip alert” duties were not neglected.

77 Squadron had to wait to prove itself. Harsh winter weather did not clear until January 8. Fifth Air Force Operations selected a target and four Meteors were assigned to attack the water tower at Chongdan. For this purpose, each plane had been outfitted to carry a load of eight rockets. They went in on the target in line astern and scored several direct hits. The tower was leaning as they left. Only one Meteor was damaged by ground fire and the mission was pronounced a success.

From then on operations began in earnest. By the end of January 1952, the pilots of 77 Squadron had flown 769 sorties. In February they broke their own Korean War record by flying 1005 sorties in spite of poor winter weather.

The Meteors were back in business.