The Defence Of Australia

1. Threats to Australia’s sovereignty short of the use of violence, through infringements of territorial waters and 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone by fishing, mining, scientific and espionage activities, through infringements of our coastline and islands by smugglers and illegal immigrants; and through infringements of our airspace for espionage and smuggling purposes.

2. Threats to Australia’s interests supported by small to moderate forces such as assaults by terrorists from abroad, disputes with neighbouring countries regarding international boundaries, seabed boundaries and free use of narrow waters, or regional confrontations based on major policy differences.

3. Threats to Australia’s vital interests supported by major force elements, such as the attempted severance of our international sea and all links, major raids by sea, land and air, limited lodgments on Australian territory and outright invasion.

The probability of the appearance of these threats is related closely to their ease of presentation. Threats of the first kind are already in evidence Therefore meeting them must be a standard requirement for our defence forces at all times, particularly In the absence of a specialised coastguard force, which is currently beyond the capacity of available Australian resources to support. Threats of the second kind could also emerge rapidly as they depend for their causation on political attitudes rather than the assembly of any sizeable military forces.

Therefore the Australian Defence Force should have a standing capacity for rapid response to these two categories of threat Threats of the third kind depend upon both political intentions and the deployment of substantial force elements. Therefore we may expect some warning of their presentation If we care to heed it. However should world order deteriorate or regional powers significantly increase their armaments, then this warning time could be reduced substantially. Just consider how many people have been surprised by the events in Iran and Cambodia. Any notion that we can forecast political events 10 to 15 years hence is nonsense. Hence, to meet major threats, the Defence Force must have standing elements sufficient to permit adequate expansion within the lead time governing the development of any such threat.

Roles of the Australian Defence Force

What then are the roles of the Australian Defence Force in securing Australia against this range of threats within the broad framework of a national security policy?

Its chief functions are to defeat any enemy use of violence against Australia or Australia’s interests, and, if possible, to deter any potential enemy from the use of such violence. The Defence Force must perform these functions without making Impossible demands upon the other components of the national security system. It must be geared to the supportive capacities of the nation and, in its structure and operations, it should not contradict other national policies, particularly those with a bearing on national security. Similarly, of course, other national policies should be designed with an eye to their implications for national security.

The operational roles of the Defence Force are four-fold:

First it must provide a warning. The most crucial developments on which to have warning are those relating to long-term threats The signals which we gather relating to such threats are essentially political and broadly strategic in nature. Economic intelligence can also be of some use In this regard but the key element Is the determination of long-term political attitudes. This role Is performed not only by the Defence Force but also by many civilian agencies However, because there are specifically military elements in the interpretation and utilisation of long-term intelligence data, the Defence Force must play a part in its gathering and assessment. The existing agencies, particularly the Joint Intelligence Organisation and the Strategic and International Policy Division of the Department of Defence make provision for military contributions to the assessment and utilisation of intelligence, but the degree of military participation in the latter appears to require expansion.

The second major function of the Defence Force is to provide a rapid reaction force to deal with those threats which can arise almost instantaneously, such as terrorism and small raids, usually carried out by sub-national groups which offer very little if any warning.

All three Services have a role to play in a rapid reaction force The army, through its Special Air Service Regiment, which is highly mobile, trained to handle a wide variety of contingencies and well-suited for small-scale operations, can meet this responsibility, but the SAS is entirely situated in Western Australia. A similar force is required in Eastern Australia, based on one of more of the regular infantry battalions, on standby for dealing with this type of contingency at short notice The force must be air-mobile, it must be supported by RAAF transport aircraft and helicopters and it may also require naval assistance. If it is required in a remote area the RAN may not be able to move with sufficient speed. But of course, a warship or a landing vessel has the advantage that it can deliver and support a small self-contained force in an operational area from its own resources Therefore in some remote area emergencies the RAN would be the best-suited of the three Services for making a rapid response.

The third specific role of the Defence Force should be that of deterrence against major types of attack on Australia or on Australian interests. Such attacks may be somewhat remote in probability, but they are absolutely crucial in terms of our survival as a free and independent nation. Therefore, we have to give high priority to the structure of the Defence Force for performing the deterrent role Australia must be able to achieve credibility of deterrence through shaping a force structure which looks effective to a potential enemy.

That consideration introduces the fourth role of the Defence Force, armed combat.

Australia will have little capacity to deter enemies if the Defence Force does not look as if it can fight, if it does not offer convincing evidence to a potential enemy that it has the capacity to inflict very substantial losses on him over a lengthy period and therefore can attach a high price to any attempts to subjugate Australia.

Thus the combat force is the basis of deterrence, but there is a difference between a deterrent force and a combat force in that the combat force has to have all of the war fighting elements already in existence, fully trained, deployed, equipped, ready for use. A deterrent force simply has to appear to an enemy as if it has the capacity to achieve the full war fighting panoply within the time required by the enemy to mobilise his force and move it to a position from where he can attack Australia.

Force Structure

I shall now examine the question of what should be the force structure appropriate to the role of deterrence because that is the most crucial and the least understood of the specific roles that the Defence Force has to perform The force structure required for the rapid reaction role is fairly self-evident and Australia has within its existing force structure the capacity to perform that role adequately. The combat force derives from the deterrent force and so most of the points that apply to a combat force structure will be discussed in the process of examining the requirements of deterrence

Before I discuss the deterrent force structure, let me explain more fully the manner in which a deterrence strategy should operate

Australia, along with many other countries, has advanced beyond the stage at which the aim of defence policy was simply to be able to meet a threatening enemy force and repel or destroy it. While that purpose must still be achievable by our future force structure, we must recognise that it is more cost-effective to deter a potential enemy from offering a threat than to maintain the force structure necessary to defeat him once he strikes. Therefore we are now more concerned than ever before about long-term trends – particularly about exercising a favourable condition influence on our security environment We have to consider how other powers might now be thinking about their relationship with Australia 10 or more years hence, In what ways they might favour the use or threat of military force against Australia and what might be required to convince them that they should go about solving their problems in some other way. In short, we are concerned with deterrence, but in most cases, it is not deterrence of the use of forces that exist but deterrence of the use of forces which exists but deterrence of the development of forces that could project substantial combat power across great distances which separate Australia from any potential enemy nation.

Deterrence is not a static strategy if an enemy believes he can attack before Australia can organise and conduct resistance, he is no longer deterred and Australia could quickly find itself fighting a war. If, in the early stages of the growth of tension between Australia and a potentially hostile state, the latter improves its strike capacity and does not observe any counter-valve response on Australia’s part, then deterrence begins to fail Nor is deterrence simply a matter of the size of forces. It is also one of social cohesion, political will, technology and strategic concepts.

A potential enemy will be constantly assessing the government’s willpower and the nation’s cohesion. Once an enemy deploys a new form of military technology surpassing his adversary’s, a deterrence relationship is quickly destabilised. Similarly, if he develops superior operational strategies or tactics, he may go to war without the benefit of superior technology or larger forces. The German Blitzkrieg concept and North Vietnam’s development of the People’s War are cases in point Consequently, accurate information on potential enemy military developments of all kinds is an essential element of deterrence strategy. Once a potential enemy moves threateningly, then Australia must demonstrate a convincing response so that the potential enemy doubts the wisdom of going right down the road to war.

Similarly, a successful deterrence strategy requires potential. enemy to have knowledge of Australia’s military capacities, particularly of changes made in response to his moves. If Australia faces a potential enemy who is felt-informed, possesses poor military judgement or is seriously irrational, then the force structure required to deter him will be much greater than for an enemy who can read and understand our warnings accurately. Hence some publicising of features of the national defence posture can help to build rather than to undermine our security. It may even be necessary to provide some kind of advanced education in these matters to regional countries for whom a serious misreading of Australian intentions and capabilities could have important consequences leading to a deterioration of security throughout the region.

The lower the force level one has as a basis for a deterrent strategy, the more dynamic and reactive one must be if an effective response to a particular threat is estimated to require several years for development, then the Government has to begin reaction to contingencies which might produce that threat the same number of years before it could be presented. Thus, white a modest force structure may be economic to support, it may carry with it a heavy defence and diplomatic penalty through having to be constantly re-adjusted to meet possible contingencies which may or may not eventuate at the end of the required response time.

Australia cannot as a normal practice maintain a large regular force, However, we have two major assets on which to capitalise Australia is an island separated by hundreds or thousands of kilometres of sea from potential attackers and has continental space around, over or through which an enemy must deploy in order to subdue our defences.

The prime obstacle for an enemy is the water gap if it is defended in depth then he has to be able to protect his advance with high capacity, long-range warships and aircraft. That is the most expensive and sophisticated form of defence technology for any country to acquire. If the water gap is defended out to a thousand kilometres and more, then the enemy has to have a large force in order to withstand the attrition he is likely to suffer during his contested approach. Furthermore, if he knows that, at the end of his approach, a substantial army of several divisions awaits him, then he must transport an equivalent or superior force across the water gap. This requirement complicates enormously the problems of obtaining sufficient shipping and protecting it. Hence, if he knows that Australia has the capacity to defend its maritime approaches by long-range naval and air forces and can meet any attempted invasion with significant ground forces, an enemy would have to have objectives of enormous importance and resources in abundance to justify such an attack. These, then, should be the elements of our deterrent posture against a major attack.

The key element of deterrence is to give the enemy the headache, not ourselves. We must force him to make an effort that is wholly disproportionate to the potential gains of his attack or invasion. An enemy is not going to attack Australia purely and simply for the fun of it. He will be attacking Australia to acquire a specific objective, perhaps control over resources, perhaps living space, perhaps control over an important strategic region

But those goals will have specific values assigned to them in the enemy’s mind. If he thinks that we can simply make it unacceptably expensive, as distinct from impossible, to achieve his goal, then he will be deterred from attempting it. It is not a matter of trying to make Australia absolutely untakeable from the point of view of an enemy Superpower. Our aim should be simply to put a very high price on attempted aggression. Sweden has given an excellent lead in the development of the sort of strategy that Australia, as a middle power, needs, not to guarantee its security 100 per cent against all comers against an enemy who is confronting Australia in isolation from any other strategic commitments, but in order to make it difficult for an enemy who already has major strategic problems elsewhere in the world, to believe that Australia would be worth the extensive resources required for an attack.

Now what are the specific requirements of a force structure for deterrence? It will be apparent from the above remarks that I believe our defence force should be structured for operations of two particular kinds – first the defence of the maritime approaches and second the defence of the Australian continent itself.

Let us consider the requirements for a maritime defence force. Its task is to defend the approaches to Australia out to a thousand kilometres and more against both naval and air attacks. Therefore, it should be both a naval and an air force but with a single purpose, offering substantial areas for trade-offs between the naval and air components. In this regard, we should not ignore the coming importance of the cruise missile. As a long-range defensive weapon that can be launched from a mobile platform, the cruise missile has much to offer in a large, sparsely populated country. It also has much to offer potential enemies who lack long-range strike forces. But I believe that it will figure in Australia’s defence more in terms of the 1990s than in terms of the 1980s. Therefore I will confine my discussion more to the sorts of naval and air forces that we will have at our disposal in the period of the next decade or so.

The naval elements of the maritime defence force are submarines, mine warfare and mine counter-measures vessels, surface combatant ships, the currently more controversial asset of naval air power and the necessary support and replenishment ships There Is relatively little controversy about the desirability of submarines and mine warfare vessels except that we would need more of them, particularly the latter if a crisis arose, so I shall not dwell at any length on them. However there is a degree of controversy concerning major surface combatants and more concerning naval air power.

What types of major surface combatants should we have?

Several classes of ships suggest themselves, ranging from the fast missile craft, a slightly bigger version of the patrol craft of the Fremantle class the RAN will acquire in the next few years, through to the frigate (using the older, British definition of a frigate as a ship of some thousand to two thousand tons rather than the US definition), the destroyer and the aircraft- carrier.

Let us consider their characteristics Patrol craft of the order of 400 to 500 tons cost up to $20 million each. They have a limited range. They are relatively expensive in terms of manpower. They have limited sea-keeping qualities and there are some very rough seas around Australia. However, they can carry substantial guided missiles They cannot carry a helicopter. We can afford a large number of them but patrol craft cannot mount comprehensive defences against a sophisticated enemy naval force. They rely more on speed, manoeuvrability and a limited offensive capacity for protection They cannot contest the control of the sea for a lengthy period against larger enemy ships.

Frigates cost approximately $50 to $75 million. They have much greater range than a fast missile boat but, as small ships, they are hard on their crews. They can keep sea in all conditions but the quality of the weapons platform they provide deteriorates substantially in rough weather.

Of course, they can carry precision-guided munitions, even a small helicopter. They have a moderate defensive capacity and we could afford ships of this kind in moderate numbers, perhaps 20 to 30 of them, if we had none larger. But, like all small ships, they are manpower intensive because they do not offer the economies of scale that a larger ship affords through better control and data processing systems, and because the number of sub-systems in a larger ship does not exceed those of a smaller by a vast quantity

Destroyers in the range of 3000 to 4000 tons cost up to $200 million each They have excellent range and sea-keeping capacity, can fight in all weathers and can carry a great variety of weapons such as precision-guided munitions, guns, anti-submarine warfare apparatus, major radar and electronic warfare equipment, data processing and fire control equipment and two substantial helicopters which can vastly increase the range of a destroyer’s detection and strike systems. A destroyer has strong defences but of course, at that cost, it is a very attractive target and so particular attention must be given to the defence of a single hull of such high defence worth in the coming age of long-range, high precision missile warfare.

Aircraft earners can be of immense size – e. g. , the US Nimitz class of 91,500 tons – but let us consider what is more feasible for Australia, such as the through-deck cruiser, the Harner Carrier, or what Admiral Sir Victor Smith has called the “Woolworth” carrier – a commercial cargo ship with a flat top added. As to cost, a throughdeck cruiser with aircraft would cost $700-$800 million, a Harrier Carrier with aircraft requires an outlay in the order of $400 to $500 million A Woolworth earner with aircraft would cost some $300 to $400 million An aircraft-earner is versatile in its performance, has a very large radius of action, a heavy strike capacity and that strike capacity is on call almost instantaneously. It can stay on station for long periods of up to several weeks or even months at a time. It is very difficult to knock out if it is properly escorted. A Navy with an aircraft carrier is a very different force from one without. A large earner can refuel other fleet units, extending the range of the whole force.

What does it take to escort an earner in a hostile environment? Estimates vary, but between one and three destroyers should be adequate in regional contingencies. Considering the current price of destroyers, a carrier with three escorts would cost approximately $1 billion. Such an expensive force element raises more of the problems of concentration of defence worth which arise in the case of the destroyer.

It is becoming increasingly attractive for a potential enemy to go to great lengths to destroy an element of this value with long-range precision-guided weaponry. While there are doubts as to exactly where the balance between offence and defence currently lies in naval warfare I am inclined to question both the capacity of the RAN to defend a VTOL aircraft earner in a hostile environment against a major enemy and the need for such a force in lesser, regional contingencies. Of course, naval experts will contest those views and they have good grounds for doing so. But, as someone concerned with the overall expenditure of defence resources, I must confess that there is a major question in my mind as to whether It is worthwhile spending $500 million on an aircraft carrier, particularly one equipped purely with VTOL aircraft.

In reviewing the different types-of warship mentioned above, the frigate does not appear to be an attractive option for the RAN because of its limitations and relatively high operating cost. The destroyer is more cost-effective and so It should be the basic element of the Fleet. However, Australia cannot afford a large number and therefore fast missile patrol craft must augment the destroyers for lower-level contingencies. I will suspend further judgment on the aircraft-carrier until after consideration of the air component of the maritime defence force.

The air component should include strike aircraft, to attack both enemy shipping and heavily defended bases and facilities supporting an assault on Australia, air defence aircraft, ASW and LAMP aircraft, airborne early warning aircraft, a control and reporting system and a nationwide network of bases.

The major question relating to the development of this force at present is the type of aircraft to be purchased for the Tactical Fighter Force. In the debate that has been generated on this topic to date, two important sub-questions have arisen:

• First, because Australia needs both strike and air defence aircraft. should the TFF consist of one or two aircraft types?

• Second, depending on the answer to the first question, what specific type of aircraft Is needed to perform the Tactical Fighter Force’s roles?

With regard to the first question as to whether the Tactical Fighter Force should be of a single aircraft type or a split force of two types, we face the difficulty that some of the chief contending aircraft are optimised for one or another particular role. Therefore, if the government decides to buy a single aircraft type there will have to be some delicate trade-offs between roles.

Strike aircraft usually offer substantial range and payload characteristics, a high capacity radar and two engines. Air defence aircraft are usually not so vitally concerned with range and payload. Smaller aircraft will perform that role effectively.

While accepting that there is some case for buying two aircraft types, the relatively small numbers of aircraft that we are likely to buy and the overall costs of the total project militate strongly against a force of two aircraft types. I believe that a split force does not make economic sense for a purchase of four squadrons of aircraft or less, and we are currently considering one squadron, to be followed perhaps by two more. There would be relatively paltry savings in terms of aircraft costs. Remember that ground attack aircraft such as the A10 variety is not an order of magnitude cheaper than a more sophisticated air-to-air combat type of aircraft when the overall project cost is considered. The RAAF would achieve savings in the order of 20 per cent for the same number of aircraft, rather than 50 per cent.

The higher overhead costs involved in having two aircraft within the Tactical Fighter Force would be very disadvantageous. Also the RAAF might thereby have not a more flexible but a more rigid force structure Admittedly, it would have two packages of aircraft to use two different roles, but if the requirement for one of those roles did not eventuate then the aircraft dedicated to that role could be of little use and the RAAF would have to rely on the smaller number of the other type of aircraft to meet its needs. If the TFF is made up of a single, multi-role type of aircraft, it can use them all in whatever role is required given that there are several aircraft types available with a wide range of capabilities, I believe that, on balance, it is preferable to have only one aircraft type In the TFF.

The answer to the second question, what specific type of aircraft is needed for the Tactical Fighter Force, is indicated by Australia’s strategic circumstances. Australia is a vast continent. An enemy has to approach Australia over hundreds, if not thousands, of kilometres of ocean. He must come by sea as much as, and probably more than, by air. Australia has a small population and a limited resource base in terms of money, technological expertise, manpower and defence facilities. Therefore the tactical Fighter Force will not be large in terms of aircraft numbers. It must have aircraft with long range, a capacity to operate over water in both the air-to-air combat and surface-strike modes and a low servicing and maintenance requirement. This aircraft should also be able to carry a heavy weapons load of many kinds, ranging from air-to-air to shipping-strike types, it should have a high-capacity radar suitable for searching wide areas, a look-down-shoot-down capability, and, preferably, two engines.

Once the Government has decided on the composition and size of the Tactical Fighter Force, it must not forget that the force requires a comprehensive early warning and control system. The over-the-horizon radar, coupled with an aircraft such as the E-2C Hawkeye, would be ideal for general force operations. Specific area air-space control and defence would be assisted by more grounds-based control and reporting radars. Finally we must not forget the tanker aircraft needed by both the Tactical Fighter Force and the F- 111s if they are to be able to range far out from Australia.

Let us now consider the naval/air force balance within the maritime defence force. The maritime defence force is a force with a single function. This factor is of relevance both to the choice of the specific aircraft for the Tactical Fighter Force and to the decision as to whether Australia buys another aircraft-carrier or not.

For example, if the Government procures the F-16 for the Tactical Fighter Force then the advocates of the aircraft carrier would have a stronger case to put than, say, if it were to buy the F-18 with its greater range and surface strike capacity. Therefore, the decisions involved in these areas must be closely related. One decision should not be taken in isolation from the other. Both decisions should be seen as affecting the same function and so they should both be taken with their mutual interaction in mind. As indicated in the previous discussion there is a serious question as to whether a carrier equipped with STOL aircraft at this time represents a wise allocation of our defence resources. Given that for $500 million Australians could perhaps buy another two squadrons of F18-As and, remembering the wide range of functions which this aircraft can perform with a lower degree of vulnerability than a single carrier, we might do better to invest that sum in aircraft.

We must not forget the F-111 in this discussion This aircraft remains a great asset as far as maritime and retaliatory strike roles are concerned. No enemy can attack Australia without having some kind of forward base system from which he can send out air and naval forces, or, ultimately cruise missiles, and the F-111 is an excellent counter-force weapon for striking these bases.

The task of the second major component of Australia’s defences, the Continental Defence Force, is to defend the Australian continent from attack by air or land. Therefore it must be both an air and ground force but, as in the maritime defence force, it has a single function. The major air components of the force are air defence aircraft, ground strike aircraft, transport aircraft, ground reconnaissance aircraft and a range of other Items such as command and liaison facilities.

Australia’s air defence does not stop at the coast-line, of course.

Continental air defence is contiguous with maritime air defence. Therefore the RAAF should remain linked together as one organisation I am not advocating any division of the RAAF by giving half of it to the RAN as a maritime support force and half of it to the Army. The RAAF must remain as a single-service.

Now let us consider individual aircraft types for the continental defence force. If a specific ground attack aircraft is purchased, it introduces yet another type of aircraft into a small air force. Further, it is becoming increasingly difficult to protect ground attack aircraft in a heavily defended environment. It is now a major question as to whether an aircraft costing $6 million or $10 million or more should be sent into such an environment where it can be shot down by a weapon costing perhaps $10,000 or $100,000. Therefore I assign low priority to the ground strike role as a justification for another specific aircraft type. That role should be left either to the air-defence aircraft of the Tactical Fighter Force or, preferably, to the Army itself by equipping it with longer-range firepower.

Now to turn to the Army. Its primary task is to hold the vital ground that is essential to the defence of this country – that is the main population centres, the chief industrial areas, and a substantial area of food and industrial resource-producing territory.

A secondary task is to exploit Australia’s continental space to cause an enemy casualties should he attempt to operate in the nonvital areas of Australia.

In performing these tasks, the Army must be able to operate throughout Australia. Not all of the Army has to be able to operate in every part of Australia, of course, but the force must have high mobility and it must be able to fight in all terrain types and weathers. The Army must be able to expand rapidly In an emergency. Hence it must be backed by large numbers of trained Reserves The Regular Army must include some redundant elements in peace so that they can train reinforcements during expansion without destroying the operating capacity of the small Regular Field Force. There must be adequate mobilisation stocks of equipment and facilities must be prepared in advance for fortifications, logistic storage, transportation and training camps.

The Army has to be able to meet four basic contingencies:

First, it must be able to defeat sophisticated enemy ground assaults on vital areas and hold them so that the national defence effort can continue. In other words, the Army must embody a major modern conventional warfare force, capable of fighting all four Phases of war, advance, attack, Withdrawal and defence.

Second, the Army must be able to exploit nonvital areas to cause enemy casualties should he operate there. The Army therefore must possess a significant territorial defence capacity over a wide area, in order to defeat raids and contain limited lodgments.

Third, the Army must be able to meet short response-time contingencies, such as raids by terrorists and guerrillas out of its standing forces.

Fourth, the Army must have some capacity to provide forces for operations abroad in support of allies and regional friends

In meeting these contingencies, the Army must be compatible with national infrastructure, not demanding more supplies, transport, etc, than Australia can provide for any particular area of operations. The Army must fit smoothly with the RAN and the RAAF in continent wide joint operations.

I do not believe that we can afford conventional ground forces of the type that we now have in the Australian Army to meet all these requirements Australia would be heavily pressed to support a well-equipped mobile Army of four or five divisions. A force of that size is slender by comparison with Australia’s surface area. However, a mobile conventional force is vital to repelling an invasion or to dealing with a major concentrated attack on a capital city. Therefore Australia must have a force of that capability but, inevitably, it will be restricted in its reach by its size. We must not let it grow to the point where it becomes impossible to sustain in operations. Further, we should not delude ourselves that we can commit such a force to operations in remote parts of Australia and supply it for a length period of sustained action. Therefore the Army should contain two types of force.

The first is the mechanised conventional formation, based on updated Regular and Army Reserve concepts and capable of expansion to a force of five divisions. The Army badly needs new equipment types for this type of force, particularly cross-country vehicles, detection systems, communications, longer-range artillery and shorter-range guided missiles. This force would be essentially responsible for the defence of the east coast and the south-west of Western Australia. The Australian Army today is essentially an infantry force. It must be more mechanised than at present, if it is to be able to respond at faster than walking pace.

The remainder of Australia would be the responsibility of a territorial defence force. This territorial force would not be simply a part-time organisation like the British Territorial Army. I am using the term “territorial” in a more literal sense. It is concerned with the defence of large areas of Australian territory. It should be based on both the Regular Army and the Army Reserve and be capable of expansion to a force of some tens of thousands so that it can support a field element which is capable, for example, of maintaining a mobile force of approximately battalion size in an area some 500 kilometres square. Some 20 of these groups would be required to cover Australia’s remote areas. Such a force would compel any enemy in that area constantly to protect his movements in order to avoid the risk of substantial casualties. It would not always be able to stop an enemy from doing what he wanted but, every time he concentrated a force to take an initiative, he would run the risk of being struck hard by a small force which could then disappear while he reorganised and tried to counter it. This concept would offer a durable means of making enemy operations in the remote areas of Australia unattractively expensive.

To link this whole structure of maritime and continental defence forces, Australia needs an appropriate command structure that recognises the functional distribution of force to these two environments – the maritime and the continental. The major components of this command structure, therefore, should be first, a maritime defence command headquarters; second, a continental defence command headquarters; and third, the supporting elements, particularly logistics and training units. This last group would be partly Joint and partly single Service as at present.

How should the balance of forces be distributed between these commands? Should we place heavy emphasis on a maritime command with a very light continental defence command, as some former Naval officers suggest; should we have the emphasis the other way round, as some former Army officers suggest, or should we have a roughly even balance?

Both types of force serve important functions in a sound deterrent posture. Hence we require each in substantial form. The components of each as they currently exist, while impressive in capability, are minimal in size. Therefore, it would not be advisable to phase out major capabilities as they currently exist, as distinct from changing the ways in which we achieve these capabilities. Therefore Australia should maintain the existing balance of financial allocation between the functional elements of the defence force.

But we face three major deficiencies in our current defence structure. First – we do not have enough money for equipment. We have not spent enough in recent years on equipment, and so our capabilities are not increasing to match our responsibilities. The two per cent real growth promised in defence expenditure as a whole could be used to increase equipment procurement by 16 per cent. A further 10 per cent increase overall would enable the equipment procurement rate to double.

The second major deficiency is that reserves are inadequate for a sound deterrent posture. The main problem in this regard, as the Miller Committee has shown, is retention rather than recruitment. If everyone who was recruited into the Reserve Forces was retained for a period of two years rather than one, Australia would have a force which would be much more than twice as effective and would probably have a force that was almost twice as big. Therefore better training and more stimulation must be provided to keep people motivated to stay in the Reserve Forces. We may need to spend a little more money on the Reserves in order to provide better training facilities, but the creation of a better Reserve should not require the expenditure of an enormous sum.

The third problem is that Australia’s defence infrastructure is poor, first for operations outside of the populated areas, and second in terms of industrial support. However, they are both major topics that cannot be covered adequately in the brief space available.

Because we are still developing a Defence Force to meet new and larger responsibilities, delays in the short term inflict much greater limitations on our capacity in the long. Hence the Australian Defence Force requires increased financial support if we are to avoid serious limitations of its capacities in the 1990s and beyond. The current economies will defer the point at which Australia will acquire the infrastructure and equipment for a moderately independent defence posture. Before this point, many contingencies could arise. If potential enemies look at Australia’s defence structure and perceive that it might face a difficult period of five to 10 years in which the nation can do very little to respond to new strategic situations, then they will have a greater incentive to put pressure on us because we may not be able to retaliate. In particular, we run the risk of allowing our deterrent capacity to deteriorate sharply if we continue to defer equipment purchases.

In conclusion, I offer the thought that Australia is defensible if we understand what is meant by a deterrent strategy. We have significant assets and we should structure our defence force to use them to the full. These assets are geographic remoteness, the sea gap, Australia’s continental size, the potential – and I stress the word “potential” – of our economy in terms of infrastructure and industrial capacity, and the proficiency and keenness of individual members of the Defence Force. However, we must recognise two major problems:

First, our remoteness reduces our importance to allies in some regards. With the best will in the world, the United States may not always be able to spring to our aid.

Second, our remoteness plus the developed state of our economy combine to produce a public debate between the extremes of complacency on the one hand and panic over-reaction on the other.

We are not in a crisis situation but we do have a very big and challenging task in front of us. Dismissing the most voluble extremes in the public defence debate will not diminish that task, although it will help to clear the air. It now remains for us to apply our minds to analysing our real security requirements and to maintain the long-term effort which is essential for transforming a dependent posture deriving from the 1950s and 1960s into one more suited for the less predictable 1980s and 1990s.

Dr Robert O’Neill is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Australia, the University of Melbourne and Oxford University. He served as an infantry officer in Vietnam, 1966-67 and lectured in history at the Royal Military College, 1967-69. He then joined the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University as a Senior Fellow. Since 1971 he has been Head of the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre. He is also Australian Office Historian for the Korean War, Armed Services Section Editor for the Australian Dictionary of Biography and a member of the Editorial Advisory Board for the publication of  Documents on Australian Foreign Policy.