The Australian Tactical Fighter Force

There is scope for much argument about whether new tactical fighter aircraft are required and, if so, what the timetable for the acquisition should be.

Insofar as the TFF issue has become confused with that of the Mirage replacement, the timetable is to some extent dictated by the fatigue life of the obsolescent Mirage III fighters. Australia currently has some 90 Mirages, divided into three squadrons, two of which (Nos. 3 and 75) are deployed at Butterworth in Malaysia and the other (No. 77) at Williamtown, NSW. Most of these aircraft have flown between 2000 and 2500 hours, but there is great uncertainty as to their ultimate fatigue life. Information supplied by the manufacturer in the 1960s indicated a fatigue life of 2300 hours dictated by the assessed life of the wing structure, but research at the Aeronautical Research Laboratories suggests that the actual figure is likely to be about double this. The RAAF and the Aeronautical Research Laboratories have “agreed to disagree”, arguing for the lower and upper figures of the 4000-5000 hour range respectively. ” Assuming that the Mirages fly 250 hours a year, most of them will still be viable into the latter 1980s in which case a replacement decision can be deferred until the early 1980s.

Another complicating issue involves the question of naval air power. Australia’s only aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne, must be retired in the early 1980s. On September 23, 1977, the RAN issued to industry an “Invitation to Register Interest in Assisting in Project Investigation of Possible Aircraft Carriers”. Responses were received from 16 overseas companies from five countries, and evaluation is proceeding within the RAN and the Department of Defence.

The type of aircraft with which any Melbourne replacement is equipped will bear directly on the TFF. At the moment, the Navy is favouring some form of Harrier- carrier, which would provide capabilities both in naval air defence and in ground attack and support for the Army.

There is a real question, however, regarding the relevance of naval air power to the defence of Australia. Naval air platforms are most expensive a single Harrier-carrier, with a dozen aircraft, has a total system cost of about $600 million, and Australia would need three of these to satisfactorily defend its shores by this means (assuming two on station and one in dock at any given time) – some $2 billion worth. (This figure does not include any imputation for destroyer escorts and other necessary support programs. ) Yet these platforms are extraordinarily vulnerable to the new generation of sophisticated precision-guided anti-ship missiles, such as the Harpoon, Exocet, or Kormoran. The whole naval air capability. could be destroyed relatively easily or cheaply, leaving Australia without adequate naval protection, since after the expenditure of $2 billion on the carriers there would be little left in the Navy’s budget for other ships.

Moreover, the ranges and speeds of today’s tactical fighter aircraft are such that ground-based strike aircraft have much more flexibility than sea-based systems in terms of striking an invading fleet. (It took. some five days for Melbourne to get from Sydney to Darwin after Cyclone Tracy. ) This capability of ground-based strike aircraft would be greatly enhanced if advantage is taken of facilities at Cocos Island and Christmas Island.

This article describes the evolution of the TFF program since the Mirage replacement was first mooted a decade ago, looks at the current status of the program, discusses Australia’s strategic requirements with respect to tactical airpower, and offers some assessment of the current contender aircraft in the light of these requirements.

The Prologue:

The TFF saga is now more than a decade old. The major milestones have been as follows: the Air Staff Target (AST) of July 27, 1970, the Air Staff Requirement (ASR) of August 20, 1971; Cabinet deliberations in September 1972; the Technical Evaluation Mission in 1973; a series of further studies and analyses in 1974-76; the Request for Proposals (RFP) of November 1976; the preparation of the initial short-list, announced by Mr Killen on April 7, 1978; and the more current developments.

A survey of these developments provides a slow-motion characterisation of Australia’s defence procurement procedures in action. * These procedures do, of course, differ for various sorts of equipment, and in the case of very large or expensive projects such as the TFF the level of Committees in the Higher Defence machinery dealing with the project is higher and the participation of the Government is greater. But the TFF is typical of other defence hardware procurement decisions in that it has gone through the established processes of the formulation of the staff target and staff requirement, the selection and sending abroad of technical evaluation missions, consideration by the Higher Defence Committees, and, finally, a Cabinet decision or, in this case, again not atypical, several related Cabinet decisions. And, the personal, bureaucratic and extra-bureaucratic inputs are also familiar ones the relevant Ministers and Departments, the Services, industry. analysis, etc.

A survey of the TFF program to date also highlights the particular issues that have dominated the considerations over the past decade. As will become apparent, the three principal issues have been those of cost, technical performance, and Australian industry participation. These three issues are discussed at the beginning of the next section.

The TFF saga began in the 1960s. Even as the Mirage Ills were still being delivered to the RAAF, the Air Staff was already considering their replacement. In September 1968, for example, some three months before the RAAF received the last of its Mirage Ills, Air Commodore R. T. Susans, the Director-General of Operational Requirements and Chairman of the Air Staff Requirements Committee, intimated that “the Air Staff (is already) looking deep into the ‘crystal bail of the future to find the aircraft types which will ultimately replace the Mirage. ” Serious commitment to the study of the Mirage replacement really began about January 1970 approximately a year after the last Mirage III had entered service. This was prompted by the US Air Force’s decision to allow McDonnell-Douglas to proceed with the development of the F-15 Eagle. The RAAF immediately began a study of the design of the F-15, and a number of senior officers in the RAAF made it clear that they would prefer the F-15 as a replacement for the Mirages. However, once the RAAF seriously began working on plans to replace the Mirages, a wide range of potential replacement aircraft had to be considered, and it was clear by the middle of 1970 that the French F-1, the successor to the Mirage III, was favoured in the RAAF’s assessment. The F-1 was favoured because it has some commonality with the Mirage Ills, the RAAF and industry are used to working with French drawings and specifications and are familiar with maintaining the Atar family of engines, Australian industry still has some jigs, tools and dies common to both designs, many officers in the Air Staff had been Mirage pilots and liked the “French fighter philosophy”, an earlier version of the F-1 was already flying, and, most importantly, the RAAF believed at this time that a decision on a Mirage replacement should be taken as early as possible.

In “Air Staff Target 74 for a Mirage. Replacement”, dated July 27, 1970, was issued to industry in September. The purpose of an Air Staff Target is to identify the requirement in broad terms of function and performance and to provide the basis for the inclusion of the project in the Five Year Rolling Program.

Through October and November the RAAF was briefed by the overseas contenders on a dozen or more different fighters considered to more or less fit the AST. Some of these aircraft such as the Lockheed CL-1200 Lancer and the LTV V-1000, were not to be heard of again; others, such as the F-15 and the MRCA (Tornado) remained contenders until the short-list refinements in 1978.

Preparation of the Air Staff Requirement (ASR) was begun in early 1971. The document, “Air Staff Requirement No. 120/74 for a Tactical Fighter Aircraft, reference 430/1/1191”, is dated August 20, 1971 but because of inter-departmental delays due to the intrusion of the Department of Supply and the Department of Defence it was not actually issued to industry until November 5.

The ASR was apparently quite clearly angled towards the procurement of an air superiority (air-to-air) combat fighter, although a secondary capability of ground attack was also required. And although it was written so as to incorporate even the most advanced fighter technology (F-15 and F-14), it left some major design aspects quite wide open the loose specifications meant either a single-seat or two-man aircraft was acceptable, as was either a fixed or swing-wing, or either single or twin engines, and the option of armament was left fairly wide open; the requirement was somewhat more restrictive in avionics. It was, however, quite categorical on two points. First, it insisted that the favoured aircraft be already flying when the order is placed; and second, on the industry side, it called for a minimum of 30 per cent production in Australia.

The overseas industry response to the ASR, initially required by February 28, 1972, was quite overwhelming so strong, in fact, that the closing date for replies was extended by a month to March 31. A Defence Department spokesman said on April 5 that about 12 manufacturers had submitted. tenders for the replacement aircraft. These were believed to have included Northrop’s P-530 Cobra, the Grumman F-14 Tomcat, the F-15 Eagle and an advanced Phantom II F-4E from McDonnell-Douglas, the F-1, the Swedish Viggen, and the Panavia 200 MRCA.

Throughout the first nine months of 1972, the interested companies continued to put forward new offers and to provide further details of their proposals. These were continuously evaluated by all branches of the Department of Air, by the Department of Defence, and by the Department of Supply. Within the Department of Air, the proposals were compared against each other and against the Staff Requirement. Cost effectiveness was supposedly a key technique in those evaluations. Eventually, a short list of suitable aircraft was prepared.

The Government, however, decided to defer the decision. This was announced by Defence Minister Fairbairn in his Ministerial Statement to Parliament on August 16, when he said that “commitment to a new air defence aircraft will not be required for some years”. Nevertheless, issues relating directly to the Mirage replacement went to Cabinet for decision a number of times during September and October. These followed particularly intense manoeuvrings by McDonnell-Douglas, Dassault, and Northrop to have their respective contender aircraft selected, moves which usually used the Department of Supply and Supply Minister Garland as the vehicle for reaching Cabinet. In July 1972, Dassault offered Australia a “no strings attached co-production deal on the F-1 fighter. This was eagerly taken up by the Department of Supply in an effort to get early assistance for the ailing Australian aircraft industry, and the proposal was taken to Cabinet by the Minister for Supply, Mr Garland, on September 25. Mr Garland went into the Cabinet meeting fully expecting to get a decision in favour of the F-1. A Cabinet subcommittee, which had included Mr Garland, had recommended that the French offer should be accepted – with the proviso that the “no strings attached” provision should be written into any agreement with the French industry. Despite this, however, a number of senior officers in the Department of Air and the RAAF correctly foresaw that acceptance of the French offer would vir. actually compel the RAAF to take the F-1 as the Mirage replacement and, in the event, Cabinet demurred. ” Because of this, in mid-October, the Department of Defence intervened and, in a letter to the Departments of Air and Supply. reminded them of their respective responsibilities specifically, it pointed out that Supply should act in a less unilateral manner and that the eventual decision would be more one of a RAAF fighter aircraft than an industry assistance measure. In- cidentally, the letter also listed the three aircraft which the two Departments should have been considering for the replacement: the F-1, the Viggen, and the P-530 Cobra. ” The Labor Party came into power on December 2 with a strong policy commitment to boosting the Australian aircraft industry. Mr Barnard himself, now Minister for Air and Minister for Supply as well as Minister for Defence, personally had high. hopes of building the Australian aircraft industry into a viable technical and economic proposition. And the fighter replacement program was to be the key in assisting (even forcing) the aircraft industry into the necessary structural and organisational reforms.

In January 1973, Mr Barnard gave instructions that a Joint Technical Evaluation Mission be selected and sent overseas to evaluate contenders for the Mirage replacement. In announcing the establishment of the evaluation mission, on March 2 1973, Mr Barnard said that “the timing of the mis- sions’s visit had been accelerated because of the Government’s concern for the future of the Australian aircraft industry and its desire to alleviate the severe problems of workload in the industry. ” The Evaluation Mission had a substantially different composition and brief from the many groups that had traversed similar circuits in previous years. Those groups were largely dominated by the RAAF, both in their personnel and their orientation to aircraft design; the 1973 mission, while it included an influential RAAF team, also had six civilian members, and was much more. oriented toward the local production possibilities of the contender aircraft.

Mr Barnard’s Cabinet submission of February 28, the Cabinet approval of which formally authorised the sending abroad of the Evaluation Mission, reportedly listed four aircraft as likely contenders for the Mirage replacement: the French Dassault Mirage F-1; the Swedish SAAB Viggen; and two American planes, the Northrop P-530 Cobra and the McDonnell-Douglas F-15. (This did not necessarily rule out other contenders. For example, the Grumman F-14, with the F-15, was to be examined for comparative purposes. ) The brief suggested a force size of 75 aircraft.

Since the role of the RAAF experts in the Mission was largely limited to a technical evaluation of the operational characteristics of the contender aircraft, they seemed at the outset to favour the F-1; on the other hand, the civilians seemed to favour the “paper” P. 530, since Northrop’s co-production program apparently offered the most benefit to the Australian industry. On the return of the mission, however, it became increasingly clear that the RAAF group, at least, preferred the F-15 much more than any of the other contenders. Hence, in its formal evaluation paper and recommendations to the Air Board, the evaluation team recommended against an early decision. In making its recommendation, the evaluation team argued that several aircraft then on the drawing boards – and specifically the F-15 would render obsolete any replacement currently on the market, that with minor modifications the Mirage Ill would be quite satisfactory until the early 1980s, and that, in any case, the RAAF had other aircraft replacements which it considered more essential. This was accepted by the Defence Force Development Committee and, in turn, by Cabinet in its budget deliberations. ” in a Ministerial Statement to Parliament on August 22, 1973, Mr Barnard announced that the Government had decided to reduce the number of Mirage squadrons from four to three.

The implication for the Mirage replacement was as follows: With the phasing out of one Mirage squadron, and the consequential reduction in overall flying effort, it is expected that the life of the aircraft remaining will be extended into the 1980s. This decision has the effect of deferring until later in the decade the need to acquire a new tactical fighter. ” Given the Government’s firm commitment not to make a Mirage replacement decision until at least 1975-76, active industry, service, and Opposition manoeuvring for a replacement virtually ceased. Instead, 1974 saw a great variety of studies, analyses, and inquiries, the most significant of which were the Mirage fatigue assessment by the Government’s Aeronautical Research Laboratories; the Industries Assistance Commission’s inquiry into the Australian aircraft industry; the Defence Department’s studies of the requirements for the defence of continental Australia; the conclusion of the Naval Air Power/Tactical Air Weapons Systems (NAP/TAWS) Study by the Supply Department’s Central Studies Establishment; and the Tactical Fighter Force study by the Air Staff’s Directorate of Aircraft Requirements.

The Mirage fatigue assessments followed the decision of the RAAF to seek a considerably longer service life for the Mirage than that substantiated by Dassault. Hence, the Department of Supply’s Aeronautical Research Laboratories were consulted and began fatigue assessment of the Mirage soon after the first aircraft entered service. By 1974, ARL had conducted sufficient flight trials, theoretical assessment, and fatigue testing to confidently predict that the Mirages would have a safe life into the 1980s. ” The IAC’s inquiry into the Australian air. craft industry followed Cabinet rejection on March 4 of a proposal by McDonnell-Douglas, strongly supported by the then Minister for Supply (Mr Kep Enderby), for the production in Australia of 79 F-15 forward fuselages. The IAC inquiry drew attention to the depressed state that the aircraft industry had fallen into following the Mirage and Macchi production of the mid 1960s.

In 1974, the Department of Defence undertook the first major study since the Second World War of the specific defence requirements and actual force structure for defending continental Australia against foreign attack. Although the principal resultant document, The Defence of Australia, was never formally accepted by the Defence Department, it was indicative of the change in the focus of thinking within the Department Most particularly, the demands of defence of Australia argued against a (relatively small) force of high technology air superiority fighters and in favour of larger numbers o cheaper, lower technology aircraft with greater tactical support strike capabilities and capable of operating from more simple airstrips.

The NAP/TAWS study was a comprehensive analysis of Australia’s tactical air requirements, covering both the character and place in the Australian force structure of naval air power as well as the range of fighter aircraft and surface-to-air weapons relevant to Australia’s air defence. The NAP/TAWS study explicitly conceded the need for the ultimate replacement of the Mirage fighters and reflected, at least partly. current Air Force thinking in indicating a clear preference for the F-1540 aircraft as a “first buy”. But, more interestingly, it also suggested a “high-low” mix, the F-158 to be complemented by ground attack aircraft of the A-7 or A-10 type.

During the second half of 1974 a number of officers in the Air Staff’s Directorate of Aircraft Requirements completed a further study of the RAAF’s tactical fighter development plans, entitled “The Future Development of the Tactical Fighter Force”.

This group included two members of the 1973 Technical Evaluation Mission (Group Captain B. H. Collings and Wing Commander M. Turnbull) and, once again, they indicated a clear preference for the F-15 – although, as with the CSE study, they were prepared to suggest a “mix” of F-15s and either A-7 or A-10 ground attack aircraft.

This period of study and analysis was followed by a similar period dedicated to the collection and processing of cost, performance and manufacturing data on each of the contender aircraft. The first phase of this was the preparation of detailed Questionnaires on each aircraft. During the first half of 1975, a wide range of questions was prepared, relating to both air combat and ground attack aircraft as well as to multi-mission aircraft, soliciting detailed information on aircraft costs (including operating and maintenance costs), performance specifications, and proposals for Australian industry participation. Most of these. questions were ready for submission to the contender companies by July 1975; the responses were to be completed by November. Because of bureaucratic delays within Russell Hill, however, the first of the questions was not submitted until September (to LTV on the A-7), and most of them were not until late December or early. January 1976. The responses were quite necessarily rushed SAAB, for example, had only 21 days between the receipt of the Questionnaire (on December 31, 1975) and the presentation of its data on the Viggen in London (on January 21); Dassault had 26 days, delivering the data on the F-1 to Lon- don on February 4, 1976. The initial analysis of this data seemed to point to the cost-effectiveness of a split tactical fighter force, with the F-15 favoured for the air-to-air role and the Jaguar, A-10 and A-7 competing for the air-to-ground role.

This data provided the background for the preparation of the “Royal Australian Air Force Request for Proposals for Tactical Fighter Force Aircraft”, completed by the Air Staff in August 1976 but not released to in- industry until November. The RFP left the question of a split force open. It included two appendices, dealing respectively with air-to- air and air-to-ground requirements, but most companies interpreted the thrust of the specifications as being towards a multi-role aircraft with capabilities in both these areas rather than towards two more specialised aircraft. Certain points of the RFP reflected the Air Staff’s decided preference for the F-15. For example, the requirements that the aircraft be capable of a speed of Mach 2. 2 at 50,000ft, that its range must be sufficient to operate from two bases 1500km apart, that the radar have an effective range of 100nm, and, most peculiarly, that the aircraft have single-wheel nose landing gear. have been seen as pointing to the F-15. The RFP was based on a TFF of 42 aircraft – at least in the first instance.

Responses to the RFP were received from 11 aircraft companies on 14 aircraft. ” The RFP had initially carried a deadline of January 17, 1977, which gave the industry less than two months to respond; although some companies made the attempt, much of the requested data was still being received in March and, in one or two cases, several months later.

The responses from the US manufacturers were particularly late. One reason was that these manufacturers were awaiting clarification by the new Administration of Jimmy Carter of its policy on Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Another was that their replies had to be vetted by the Pentagon. This was time-consuming enough, but in the case of the F-16 the Pentagon seems to have been particularly obstructive. Full details of the F-16 were not in fact delivered to the Australian Embassy in Washington until June 11. According to one report, the delay was caused by the refusal of the Pentagon to release information on the compatibility of the Sparrow missile with the F- 16, but another report attributed it to “an extraordinary campaign of obstructionism (by the US Air Force) in order to attempt to promote sales of the F-15″,” Despite the incomplete nature of the replies, analysis of the proposals was begun in February 1977. The Computing Services Division of the Department of Defence programmed all the data into a format for comparative analysis of the aircraft, which was undertaken by both the TFF Project Office and the Force Development and Analysis Division in the Defence Department.

On April 21, Mr Killen announced that the RAAF had completed the initial evaluation of the 14 aircraft contenders, and that the RAAF’s initial recommendations were now with the Force Structure Committee. The RAAF’s evaluations were made by a team of specialists headed by the Director-General of the Tactical Fighter Project, Air Com. Moore J. H. Flemming.

The evaluations were delivered to the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal J. M. Rowlands, on March 31, and were considered by the Force Structure Committee at meetings on April 12 and 19. The RAAF had hoped that these meetings would produce an initial shortlist, and had in fact drafted a proposal that would have limited further consideration to the F-15, F-18, F-16, Mirage 2000, and the Tornado.

However, the Force Structure Committee was not willing to allow the project to proceed to this next step at that time. According to one report, the FSC was “stunned at the final price figures submitted by the companies bidding for the new tactical fighter force”. ” It also seems that the proposals for AIP were all substantially less than the 30 per cent target figure. The uncompetitive nature of Australian industry meant that while most of the overseas companies were willing to place work in Australia, the amount that could be competitively placed here was 11 per cent in the highest instance (the older technology A-7) and in other cases less than 10 per cent. As a result, a series of working committees was established to clarify various remaining questions and to provide a thorough examination of the cost and AIP issues. These working committees were tasked with particular responsibilities such as the determination of Australia’s strategic requirements with regard to tactical air power, the force structure implications of alternative tactical fighter forces, Australian industry participation (AIP), Mirage refur- bishment options, and costs and finance, and were to report in October.

With these reports in hand, the higher Defence Committees proceeded to finalise a short list for the TFF. At a meeting on November 29, 1977, the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) approved for recommendation to the Minister a list consisting of the F-15, F-16, F-18 and Mirage 2000. ” This list came in for trenchant criticism from both within Defence and from industry, primarily on the grounds that the air superiority requirement was being pursued at the expense of the strike requirement and of overall balance and flexibility in the force. Panavia, the manufacturer of the Tornado MRCA, made extensive representations both within the Defence Department and also at the political levels, including a private reminder to the Prime Minister that the Tornado might be used as a bargaining counter in the European trade negotiations. in order to have the Tornado reinstated on the DFDC list before it received Ministerial approval.

On April 7, 1978, Mr Killen made a statement to the House on “The Further Development of the Tactical Fighter Force”. The Minister announced that air superiority was to be given priority in the acquisition of the new fighter, that initial procurement would provide for only a single squadron of fighters but that a three-squadron structure was to be retained, and that further evaluation of aircraft was to be confined to the following air-to-air aircraft the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation F-15 and F-18A, the Northrop Corporation F-18L. the General Dynamics F-16, the Panavia Tornado and the Dassault-Breguet Mirage 2000. ” The Minister also announced on April 7 that in order to help the Government confirm a short list of new fighters for the air-to-air role, an overseas visit at the senior departmental level will be made within the next few weeks. This team will explore with Governments and administration elements. future procurement intentions of other countries. production expectation of the contending aircraft and their weapons systems, and possibilities of technological developments.

This “policy team”, led by Mr D. H. Eltringham, Deputy Secretary C of the Department of Defence, left Australia on May 24 and visited six countries. The Mirage 2000 was discussed in Paris, the Panavia Tornado in Munich and London, and in Brussels, the team met with the coproducers of the F-16 in Europe; discussions were held in Ottawa with Canadian defence officials on Canada’s new fighter aircraft program; and the F-15, F-16, F-18A and F-18L were studied in the United States. The policy team prepared a report for the DFDC at the end of July. The shortlist recommended by the DFDC on the basis of this report was announced by Mr Killen on October 24, 1978.

The Minister stated, inter alia, Following and overseas inquiry by senior departmental and Air Force officers into future production prospects and costs, and after consultations with Australian aircraft and electronic industries, the Government has decided to confine further detailed evaluation to the following four aircraft: McDonnell-Douglas Corporation F/A-18; Northrop Corporation F-18L; General Dynamics F-16; and Dassault-Breguet Mirage 2000 While the Panavia Tornado and the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation F-15 have been removed from further consideration, both of these aircraft have many excellent qualities. In evaluating them against Australia’s strategic circumstances, and against other competing demands on our limited resources, the Government has assessed that the other contending aircraft could meet. better and less expensive. Australia’s operational priorities from the mid-1980s onwards.

A month later, on November 28 and 29, a Bidder’s Conference of the TFF contenders was held at Russell Hill. The principal purpose of this conference was to emphasise to the contenders the central importance of AIP in the TFF project. ” It was at this conference that the Defence Department detailed the concept of designated work, a concept which Mr Eltringham had introduced to the overseas companies during his May- July mission.

On March 8, 1979, Mr Killen informed the House that operational/technical and industrial evaluation missions which he had foreshadowed in his April statement had now been selected and would be leaving for overseas in the near future to examine the four selected aircraft to ascertain their operational suitability and to discuss the capacity and willingness of manufacturers to satisfy our industry objectives at an acceptable Cost The industrial mission, led by Mr G. J. Churcher, left Australia in mid April. It comprised five people, specialists in the fields of aircraft engineering, manufacture and maintenance. The operational and technical mission, led by Air Vice Marshal H. A. Hughes included experienced fighter and test pilots, engineering specialists in the wide range of technical disciplines involved, and officers experienced in supply, logistics and costing.

The Hughes mission left Australia on March 29 and arrived back on June 12; the Churcher mission arrived back on June 19.

Both teams found their evaluation reports extremely difficult to produce. The main problem for the operational/technical team was that it was only able to fly one operational aircraft the F-16, which was flown by Wing Commander Bruce Grayson (four times). Wing Commander Robert Richardson (four times), Group Captain O. G. Worth (once), and Air Vice Marshal Hughes himself. The RAAF test pilots were able to fly a pre-production model of the Mirage 2000 (prototype 02), but they were not able to test the full performance of a normal production model. With regard to the F-18, the team flew the YF-17 prototype of the F-18L, and used the F-18A flight simulator at McDonnell-Douglas’ headquarters in St Louis, but this was obviously not as satisfactory as testing an actual F-18. Even in the case of the F-16, the aircraft flown would differ significantly from any F- 16 procured by Australia; it had different missile fits and probably a different engine.

The problem facing the industrial evaluation team derived from the realisation of the high-cost penalties incurred in obtaining any substantial level of Australian industry participation. It was difficult to determine exactly what the cost of tooling up local industry would be, let alone the impact of the relatively short production run, the relatively low labour productivity in the Australian industry, and of the modifications necessary to all the contender aircraft- but for 30 per cent AIP the cost premium to be expected would be about 60 per cent.

These reports were completed by July 23, and then submitted to the Chief of the Air Staff and the Defence Source Definition Committee (DSDC) for consideration.

The Government has resisted attempts by the RAAF and other interested parties to extract some indicative schedule for the final phase of the TFF acquisition project. Clearly, the next few months will be spent consolidating and assessing the information brought back by the Churcher and Hughes missions. Perhaps the DFDC will recommend to Cabinet that the current shortlist be further refined to two aircraft, although this would seem to have no obvious advantages over the current list from the point of view of comparative evaluation and sound decision-making. The final decision can now be expected sometime next year, perhaps timed less to accord with the development of the 1980-81 defence budget than with the 1980 Federal election campaign!

The Prospects:

It is clear from the prologue that, from the point of view of looking to the eventual outcome of the TFF acquisition project, there have been three principal considerations in the TFF decision the enormous costs of buying and operating current fighter aircraft, Australian industrial involvement in the TFF project, and the specifications and technical performance of the particular relevant fighter aircraft.

The impact of economic and fiscal considerations has been central to the TFF decision-making. For example, Mr Barnard stated in November 1972, looking forward to his Ministership, it is most unlikely that resources would be available for the purchase of top price aircraft such as the F-14 and F-15 in the years ahead”. ” The F-15, together with the Panavia Tornado, was eventually removed from further consideration principally because of their high costs in a situation of “other competing demands on our scarce resources”. ” More generally, the Government’s preoccupation with fiscal restraint over the past several years has been an important factor in the inordinate delays which the TFF project has suffered.

The budgetary demands of the TFF are truly staggering. According to Air Vice Marshal Hughes, the initial procurement cost of the TFF, ie, the acquisition cost of the aircraft together with two to three years’ supply of spares and initial support equipment, is likely to exceed $1 billion. By comparison, the budget for all new major equipment projects for all three Services in the last financial year was only $6 million, and” the total expenditure on capital equipment in 1977-78 was only $319. 238 million. ” Over the life in service of the TFF, the life cycle cost (LCC) of the program will probably come to more than $2. 5 billion, more than this year’s total defence budget! These magnitudes are particularly frightening in the light of the relatively small unit numbers involved. A procurement budget of $1 billion would allow the acquisition of rather less than 100 aircraft, and in the case of most of the current contenders, less than three squadrons. (The situation would have been even worse, of course, in the case of the F-14, F-15 or Tornado. ) Given the high unit costs involved, there was obvious reason to question whether a Tactical Fighter Force of larger numbers of lesser quality and lower cost aircraft might not be more capable than a smaller force of higher cost, higher quality aircraft. This is particularly the case since over the period from the 1950s the escalation in costs of military aircraft has been several factors greater than the increase in technical performance (as measured by payload, range or endurance, speed, avionics functions, and delivery or navigation accuracy). ” This suggests that a move down the technology ladder could well result in a TFF of greater overall cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the unit costs of some tactical fighters are so high that to procure them would result in a force that would be insufficient to ensure that aircraft could be in enough places at the same time to fulfil the mission requirements – particularly given the large distances in- involved in the defence of Australia. In any case, as a general principle, Australia should avoid having its defence capabilities dependent upon a relatively small number of units the loss of one or a few of which would seriously degrade those defence capabilities. However, the strategic arguments with respect to “quantity versus quality” have not figured in Defence considerations; rather, the rejection of the higher cost aircraft seems to have simply been due to sheer fright at the unit magnitudes involved.

The second principal question has been that of Australian industrial participation in the TFF project. Indeed, throughout the last decade, the need for a viable Australian aircraft industry has ranked equally with the need for a new fighter in the Government’s deliberations. In 1971, when the Air Staff Requirement was being prepared, it was made clear to the Air Force that the ASR should include not only factors of cost and performance but also a detailed explanation of Australia’s requirement to produce much of the selected aircraft in this country, and stringent conditions for offset arrangements by which Australia could recover as much as possible of the full amount spent overseas on the aircraft.

As noted above, a minimum of 30 per cent production in Australia was specified. On those occasions when the TFF has gone to Cabinet, in September and October 1972 (the F-1) and March 1974 (the F-15), it has been on the initiative of the Minister for Supply (Senator Garland in the LCP Government and Kep Enderby in the Labour Government), acting on behalf of the aircraft industry, rather than of the Defence Minister. Indeed, on both those occasions, the Defence Ministers opposed the sub-missions of their Supply colleagues, on the grounds that accepting work on the F-1 or F- 15 would have committed the RAAF to particular aircraft before its own evaluations had been completed. The 1973 evaluation mission, which with hindsight was quite premature, was also due principally to “the Government’s concern for the future of the Australian aircraft industry and its desire to alleviate the severe problems of workload in the industry”. ” The principal reason for the delay in the TFF project following the RFPs was the low AIP which the contenders could come up with when Australian production costs were taken into account. This has led to intensive involvement of high level Defence officers, particularly Deputy Secretary Eltringham, in order to ensure greater AIP. In mid 1978, the concept of designated work was introduced to supplement the offset proposals. The Department of Defence has defined “designated work” as follows: Designated work is that part of the production activities, associated with the equipment being purchased, carried out by Australian industry for the Australian Government’s own strategic or other related reasons. The level of assembly and manufacture to be undertaken in Australia is determined by the Australian Government based on the proposals submitted by the suppliers. Such work is supported by Australian Government funds and is not eligible as offset credit; however, competitive advantage can be gained by proposals which identify ways to reduce the cost to Australia of undertaking the proposed tasks. ” The Government still requires that the supplier of the selected aircraft guarantee offsets amounting to “at least 30 per cent of the cost of the imported value of the program”. The AIP guidance paper does not spell out the specific level of designated work required by the Australian Government, but press reports cite Mr Eltringham as expecting about 20 per cent of the work to come into the “designated” category. This means that the Australian industrial share of the TFF program could be as high as 50 per cent.

Again, however, there is a lack of strategic criteria for determining the specific character of the AIP requirements, and for determining the relative priority of the fighter as opposed to the industry requirements. The guidance paper issued to the contender companies in November 1978 set out the objectives of the Government’s notion of designated work more clearly than any previous statement-it is to reduce the level of Australian dependence on overseas spares support, provide limited expertise in industry in the range of technologies involved in the aircraft and its systems and establish a basic capability to contribute to the development of any necessary adaptations or modifications to the aircraft and engines or updating of the equipments throughout the lift of the aircraft.

But there remains a widespread lamentation from industry regarding the specifics of the industrial requirements of the TFF program.

More generally, there is a need for the Government to clarify the relative priorities of the fighter and the industry program – to decide “which comes first the RAAF’s fighter choice or the (production) program”. ” It has been tempting for the Government, under constant pressure from the Departments of Supply and Productivity and the local aircraft industry, to view con- tender AIP offers as offering an answer to the problems of the Australian aircraft industry. As the industry itself recognises, however, to accept any of the co-production packages associated with the Mirage replacement submissions before deciding the basic question of equipment choice for the RAAF is putting the cart before the horse. ” The third aspect of the TFF decision making to date has been the concentration on narrow performance capabilities and particular aircraft specifications. The TFF has in fact been studied and analysed more than any other weapons procurement decision in Australia’s history. The original Air Sta Requirement of August 20, 1971 was probably the most detailed staff requirement ever written; it received an overwhelming response which, together with the Al Staff Target issued in September of the previous year, produced an enormous amount of material for further study and analysis. The Overseas Evaluation Mission c March-May 1973 was probably the most comprehensive ever undertaken. The Cen tral Studies Establishment’s “Naval Ai Power/Tactical Air Weapons Systems (NAP/TAWS) study of 1970-74 was the mos detailed and protracted study ever done o military equipment requirements for the Australian armed forces. The Air Staff’s “Fighter Development and the Tactical Fighter Force” study of 1974 was similarly unprecedented in its depth of analysis. And the November 1976 RFPs were issued only after the collection and digestion of a further enormous amount of data.

There are, of course, some significant gaps in this data. This is particularly the case with those aircraft such as the F-18L and the Mirage 2000 which are still under development. Indeed, even though the F- 18L remains on the current short list, it was not included in the comparative evaluations undertaken by the RAAF and the Force Development and Analysis Division that produced that short list because of the lack of reliable data.

More fundamentally, however, there is a lack of adequate strategic guidance on how to evaluate this enormous mass of data. What are the capabilities required of the TFF? Can these be satisfied within a force of a single type of aircraft or must the RAAF procure a split force? Of the various roles and missions that a modern fighter aircraft can undertake, what are the priorities demanded by Australia’s strategic environment? The Minister’s statement of April 7 last year is not very illuminating; its generality is too high to be analytically useful. With regard to TFF capabilities, the Minister said that these must encompass air defence, air superiority, interdiction including anti-shipping capability, tactical reconnaissance and close support of ground forces. It is beyond doubt that the Royal Australian Air Force must at all times possess these capabilities, whether in time of high or low current threat.

Moreover, air superiority is to be accorded priority. ” Neither the Minister’s statement nor any supporting arguments from Defence or RAAF officers mentioned the word “deterrence”. Yet the principal function of the TFF as indeed of the whole Australian defence posture and structure – should be to deter an attack upon the Australian continent, its island territories and its basic national interests, ie, to indicate to any potential adversary that the costs to him of any attack are likely to far outweigh any benefits he might hope to achieve – if, in-deed, he was not to be completely denied those benefits.

Unfortunately, it might well be the case that the sort of tactical fighter force which is designed to fulfil the deterrent role may be somewhat less suited to defending Australia in an actual combat environment.

Indeed, it is an axiom in the strategic literature that the criteria for deterrence and for defence are not only different but could even be quite incompatible. The objective of military deterrence is to reduce the probability of enemy military attacks, by posing for the enemy a sufficiently likely prospect that he will suffer a net loss as a result of the attack, or at least a higher net loss or lower net gain that would follow from his not attacking. Deterrence in this sense is a process of influencing the enemy’s intentions. The strategic policy and associated force structure required for this process may be quite unsuited for the conduct of military operations in the event that deterrence fails.

It is much more difficult to illustrate this defence/deterrence dichotomy at the tactical level than at the strategic level, but one example relating to the use of strike aircraft will be outlined here. Equipping the Australian F-111C strike force with nuclear weapons could, at least perhaps under some circumstances, provide a quite for-merchable deterrent force. But that same force would have many inadequacies for actual defence operations. It would, for example, lack credibility in situations of relatively low level threats, probably even up to the point of rather extensive lodgements on Australian territory. Even for larger scale threats, it would lack credibility if the notional adversary also possessed a nuclear strike force; in this situation, a nuclear stalemate would pertain and conventional airpower would be required in actual force engagements. In any case, the possession of nuclear weapons does not automatically guarantee that deterrence will not fail. Aggression could still occur through irrationality, misperception, accident, or whatever, and the forces required to successfully deal with that aggression are more likely to be much larger numbers of aircraft equipped with precision-guided conventional weapons rather than a small number of relatively vulnerable F-111s.

Rather than being solely designed for a deterrent role, then, the TFF must also have at least some capability for actual conventional war-fighting purposes. Indeed, given Australia’s limited resources, the deterrent mission may have to be severely compromised in order for a credible defence force to be procured. Hence, any deterrent capability that inheres in the TFF should be regarded more as a bonus deriving from a well-structured defence or denial capability rather than as a separate objective in itself.

With regard to operational missions, it is an accepted, and undeniable, principle of conventional warfare that “command of the air” is paramount. Unfortunately, the RAAF has argued from that Australia requires the most modern and sophisticated air superiority fighter. The logic does not follow. Achieving and maintaining air superiority does not necessarily imply the procurement of the most advanced fighter aircraft. It is the force itself the aircraft and associated weapons systems, the basic structure, the logistic support, the pilot training, etc – rather than any single component which is relevant in assessing relative airpower capabilities.

Moreover, an air superiority posture is a relative rather than an absolute capability, depending as it does on the relative quality of the adversary: bettering him, rather than erecting the most effective air defence umbrella available, is sufficient.

Even with the present Mirages, Australia already has this capability vis-a-vis any of our near neighbours.

In any case, the achievement of air superiority can be accomplished in a variety of ways, of which air combat is perhaps one of the least cost-effective. It is a much sounder strategy to destroy an enemy air force on the ground, attacking as well the airfields and logistic structure on which that force depends.

While air superiority is, then, a necessary requirement for the RAAF, it does not necessarily follow that a tactical fighter force of high-performance air superiority fighter aircraft is required. Much depends upon the specific secondary missions required of the RAAF, such as interception, maritime strike, interdiction, or whatever, and upon the relative capabilities of the adversary’s tactical air power and the environment in which the engagements will take place. It could well be that, at least against some of the regional powers, particular aircraft op- optimized for these latter missions but also equipped with some air defence capability could cover themselves with sufficient point defence to render unnecessary any more general air superiority capability.

Given the general threat environment expected to face Australia in the next 10-15 years, particularly the capabilities of regional air forces, and the expected environment of future Australian military operations, the essential requirements for Australian tactical air power are capabilities for offensive counter-air operations, maritime strike, long-range interdiction strike, and long-range interception-with sufficient air supremacy to allow these operations to proceed without any effective interference from the opposing air forces.

From a defence of Australia perspective, the primary role of the RAAF is, while not engaging in “forward defence” operations as occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, to keep any enemy from Australia’s shores. Various forms of air strike capabilities are essential for this.

With regard to enemy operations against Australia using airfields and support bases in the island archipelago or New Guinea, or even using makeshift fields established In some limited lodgement in the north-west of the continent, the relevant strike capability is for offensive counter-air operations which are generally quite cost-effective.

A long-range interdiction strike capability is also necessary against forces already lodged or in the process of lodging on the Australian continent, whether in some limited lodgement or full-scale invasion. Since Korea, in which aerial warfare quickly became a war of interdiction, and through the limited wars of the 1960s, it has become clear that the primary use for fighters in the wars that were actually happening (as opposed to the ones often planned for by Defence Departments) is in ground attack. Because of the relatively large number of potential landing points on the Australian coastline, and the impossibility due to resource and population constraints of providing point defences along the whole of it, and given a similar argument regarding the enormous size of the continental land mass itself and the disparate routes which an aggressor could choose to cross it, a long-range interdiction strike capability is essential for Australia.

This points to the prime requirement for a strike fighter, equipped with long-range stand-off missiles for attacking enemy bases, lodgements and logistic support. Such a fighter could also operate in the anti-shipping roles.

Any enemy attack on Australia must come across the sea. Even if the main invasion force is flown in, the support, armour and logistics without which it could not be sustained, must come in ships. The essential requirement for the Australian TFF is the capability to sink these ships.

Such an aircraft would also have an inherent capability for providing close support of ground forces. However, this should be considered a “bonus” rather than a program requirement. The RAAF can far better assist the Army by wreaking havoc on an invading force at sea, rather than by assisting it in bloody battles on the sea-shore. The place to stop armour and other enemy forces is where they are concentrated, such as at points of disembarkation and en route to the battlefield, which calls for some interdiction strike capability, rather than at the battlefield itself. Alternative means of support seem to be more cost-effective in operations at the actual front such as light anti-tank and long-range anti-tank missiles, integrated with surface-to-air systems under the control of the ground forces themselves.

Because of the strategic situation of Australia an island continent, with a coastline of 12,000 miles, a land mass of three million square miles and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of that again; a relatively small population (14 million) and resource base ($2. 5 billion annual defence expenditure) compared to this area of six million square miles; and a poor defence in- infrastructure (in terms of transport and communications facilities and inadequately dispersed maintenance and support facilities) -the tactical fighter force must have a number of rather specific characteristics. The most important of these are as follows: Given the distances involved in the defence of Australia and the particular requirement for long-range maritime and interdiction strikes, range is obviously very important. Certainly, the limited range of the present Mirage Ills has been an inadequacy recognised by many RAAF and Defence planners.

It is not possible to specify any actual range requirement. The figure depends on the ultimate basing structure of the TFF, the possibility of aerial refuelling, and the strategy and tactics (including deliverable payload desired) the force is to employ. A good base can be made for a much more dispersed basing structure involving, in addition to Williamtown, TFF basing at Tindal, Townsville, Pearce, Learmonth, Darwin, and perhaps Alice Springs, thus providing a more forward operating capability than the present structure. Aerial refuelling is a capability that a number of RAAF officers have at various times attempted to write into Staff Requirements, but rather than insist on this capability, together with the tankers and support equipment and structures,” it would seem preferable to combine disperse. ed forward basing with an inherently long-range platform.

For a number of missions, such as Mari. time strike, interdiction strike, and offensive counter-air strikes, at least some of this range will have to be covered at low altitudes. According to a report of the US General Accounting Office, one of the current TFF contenders has a combat radius in the strike role of 580 nautical miles. ” The Australian strategic environment also demands that the tactical fighter have a high-capability radar. It must, for example, have a long-range, to complement that of the fighter itself the RFP requirement of 100nm is quite arbitrary, but it would certainly be satisfactory. The radar must also have a “look-down” capability for use in the strike mission. It should also be capable of operating with the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar system”- this is no problem for the F-18s Hughes AN/APG-65, but it is questionable in the case of both the Mirage 2000 and the F-16.

Australia cannot assume that an attack would be made only in daylight and in good weather; hence, the TFF must have an all-weather, day and night capability. This is particularly important for strike operations.

Both the F-16 and the Mirage 2000 have single engines, while the F-18 has two engines. There has been much debate in the United States regarding the relative cost-effectiveness of single- or twin-engine aircraft. Some of this has periodically surfaced in Australia, particularly following periods of frequent Mirage crashes (such as July- August 1972 and March-August 1976), with reports of pilot preferences to twin-engine aircraft. But any evaluation of single-versus twin-engine aircraft needs to take into account peacetime attrition comparisons of single- and twin-engine aircraft, relative combat survivability (based on aircraft size and engine redundancy) of the respective aircraft, procurement and maintenance costs of one and two engines, and performance characteristics of the aircraft. There is no known or accepted and conclusive analysis of the single versus twin-engine issue. In general, historical data can be manipulated to support either engine configuration. However, two engines seem preferable for roles and missions associated with naval air power and for strike and ground support operations.

With regard to weapons, the range/payload combination of Australia’s tactical fighter must be sufficient to allow the delivery of substantial weapons loads over long ranges. It is not, however, possible to specify exactly what the payload capability should be. This will depend on many factors such as the precise definition of and balance between the mission requirements; the range at which tactics and strategy determine the various strike roles should be carried out; the amount of electronic warfare and capability reckoned as necessary to carry on board for the success of the postulated missions; and since kill probabilities are much more a function of delivery accuracy rather than of bomb size, the avionics fits may be of more importance than simple payload capacity.

More important than the weapons payload is the weapon carriage versatility. It should be possible for the platform to carry air-to-air missiles, free-fall bombs, guided bombs, and air-to-ground missiles. However, two particular weapons capabilities are essential. First, Australia’s tactical fighter must have the ability to carry a long-range all-weather, radar-guided, air- to-air missile (such as the Sparrow or the Skyflash); its air-to-air capability must not be limited simply to short-range, good-weather, dog-fight situations. Second, it must be able to carry an anti-shipping missile (preferably Harpoon, although the Exocet or Kormoran could suffice) for maritime strike operations. Moreover, these capabilities should be integral to the air. craft’s design and development to add them subsequently, even if practicable, would degrade overall performance and greatly increase the cost to Australia. ” Advanced avionics systems are essential for successful military operations in today’s “electronic battlefield”. In the case of the tactical fighter, it is important that as much as possible of the avionics be digital. Analogue avionics take up excessive space, have slower processing times, are generally less efficient, and have much less future adaptability; this last deficiency would be extremely grave should the fighter have to work together with the Jindalee system or a future airborne early-warning and control aircraft (such as the Hawkeye E-2C).

It is also essential, for deterrence no less than for defence, that in time of emergency, the Australian tactical air power posture have a well-developed capability for the dispersal of the fighter force and its necessary supporting elements.

One apparent consequence of the recent developments in conventional weaponry is that fixed bases are becoming increasingly vulnerable, even if measures are taken to protect and harden the weapons systems themselves. Air Forces which require for the aircraft long take-off and landing strips could be rendered useless. And with precision-guided munitions, the aircraft themselves, even if dispersed in steel and concrete shelters, no longer have their survivability assured. This has a particular importance for the defence of Australia since. not only would Australian forces be dependent for their operations on the Australian structure (rather than more forward bases) but also the adversary would very likely have the initiative to attack that structure. For deterrence, it is only the forces surviving the postulated enemy first strike which are relevant to the calculus. With the return of No. 3 and No. 75 squadrons from Butterworth, consideration should be given to a more rationalised dispersal of the TFF at RAAF bases within Australia in addition to Williamtown, to, for example, Amberley, Tindal and Darwin, and possibly even Townsville, Pearce and Learmonth (with some upgrading of the necessary support facilities). Even so, short take-off and landing (STOL) and rough-field capabilities need to be taken into account in any discussion of the criteria for evaluating contender aircraft. Finally, Australia’s tactical fighter should be able to be supported and maintained by the Australian aircraft industry. Of course, there will always be some parts and some maintenance and modification technologies available only from overseas, and Australia must be assured of wartime support from the supplier country. It is most important that production lines for the selected aircraft be still running into the 1980s, with guarantees of spares into the 1990s.

There remains the question of whether the TFF should consist of a single type of aircraft or of a “split force” of two aircraft. Mr Killen’s statement of April 7, 1978 implied that the Government would accept a “split force”, with the procurement of a ground attack fighter to follow the current air superiority evaluation. As noted above, this notion was supported by the RAAF’s study of the “The Future Development of the Tactical Fighter Force” in 1974 and by the Central Studies Establishment’s NAP/TAWS study at about the same time; some of the responders to the November 1976 RFP also interpreted that document to be suggesting a split force. ” However, there are a number of reasons why the TFF should consist of a single type of aircraft. To begin with, there are very severe budget constraints that must apply to the TFF as much as to other defence procurement programs. Given the relatively small size of the Australian TFF, the duplicated support and maintenance efforts would probably take up a quite disproportionate share of the allocated program budget. Initial spares and support provisions would have to be established. The two aircraft are likely to have different engines and use different ammunition. No Chief of Air Material could readily support such a proposal.

In any case, it is not clear that Australia’s military requirements call for a dedicated close air support aircraft; given the widening technological menu available to the Army, it could very well make more sense to look to surface-based systems for fulfilling its needs.

Moreover, most air superiority aircraft, and certainly any strike aircraft, will have some inherent capability for ground attack. This could be well supported if the new trainer aircraft was required to also have a good weapons delivery capacity.

The argument, then, comes down in favour of a relatively large number of a single type of aircraft, with the emphasis on a multi-purpose strike fighter, a fighter force capable of maintaining air superiority over Australia and any associated regions of conflict, and of conducting strike operations, particularly in the maritime context. The current short-list includes two sure fighters in addition to an aircraft which is primarily an air combat fighter and c which is primarily an interceptor. There is doubt in my mind but that the strategic requirements of the defence of Australia pc unequivocally to a strike fighter. Unfortunately though, these strike fighters are a parently only included in the short-l because of their concomitant prowess in the air superiority role a reversal of sou strategic priorities given the Australi defence environment. For most of the tin, since the TFF began its long saga a decade ago, the Air Force has been advocating dedicated air superiority fighter-not the F-15. At least the F-15 had stro residual strike and ground attack capabilities. It seems to me that was the Department of Defence and the Government to accept any RAAF argument for a fight that lacked even these residual capabilities, then Australia would be in for $2 billion disaster. However, if I read the te leaves correctly, there is now a much greater appreciation within the Defence establishment of the need for a fighter with a least some secondary maritime strike capability. Were this appreciation to prevail Australia would acquire a worthwhile and eminently sound defensive and deterrent capability through to the beginning of the next century.